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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to U.C.A. § 
78-2-2(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. This Court should reverse the trial judge's determination as to the value of the 
water system on grounds other than those impermissible by the Utah Supreme Court. The 
standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard. 
2. This Court should reverse the trial court's finding that the 1977 Well Lease and 
Water Transportation Agreement was a valid encumbrance on the water system on grounds 
other than the PSC Order of March 17,1986. The standard of review is a legal correctness 
standard. 
CONSTITUTIONAL, PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules pertinent to the 
resolution of the issues presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a lawsuit originally filed by Plaintiff Hi-Countiy Estates 
Homeowners Association on March 8, 1985. After convoluted proceedings in the lower 
court, Homeowners appealed certain decisions by the trial judge as outlined more 
specifically in the Statement of Facts, infra. After proceedings before the Utah Court of 
Appeals, and subsequently the Utah Supreme Court, the appeal was referred back to this 
Court by the Utah Supreme Court. 
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Homeowners subsequently filed their "Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion to Decide Certain 
Appeal Issues on Other Grounds" on December 7, 1995. Foothills Water Company 
(hereafter "Foothills") filed a response to Homeowners' Motion, and Homeowners 
subsequently filed a reply to Foothills' response. This Court then subsequently issued an 
Order requiring full briefing of the issues involved in Homeowners' Motion. See greater 
details in Statement of Facts, infra. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 8,1985, Homeowners filed the instant action (R. 2-17). Homeowners 
subsequently filed a Second Amended Complaint (March 16,1987) asking the Court to quiet 
title and/or issue a declaratory judgment declaring the rights and responsibilities of 
Homeowners with respect to ownership of a water system, water lots, a water right and the 
real estate and easements related thereto, which serves Hi-Countiy Estates Subdivision 
Phase I in southwestern Salt Lake County. (R. 296-304). 
2. Defendant-Appellees Foothills Water Company (hereafter "Foothills") and Dansie 
answered Homeowners' Second Amended Complaint on March 21, 1987, and counter-
claimed against Counter-Claim Defendants Sims and Turner for slander of title and against 
Homeowners to quiet title to the water right, water system and components in Foothills 
Water Company. Dansie and Foothills also filed a Cross-Claim against Defendants Spencer 
and Lewton for slander of title (R. 341-352). 
3. Homeowners replied to the Dansie and Foothills Counterclaims on July 9, 1987 
(R. 371-373). 
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4. Charles E. Lewton and Keith Spencer, two of the original developers of Hi-
Countiy Estates Subdivision Phase I, having chosek to disclaim their interest in any of the 
property involved, allowed judgment to be taken against them. (R. 897, 902, 904). The 
same was true of Defendants Hi-Countiy Estates, Inc., and Hi-Countiy Estates Second (R. 
897, 902, 903). No appeals were taken by any of these parties. Defendant J. Rodney 
Dansie participated in the lower court but failed to appeal from any of the Court's Orders 
in this case. All unknown persons claiming an interest in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision 
were served pursuant to an Order Authorizing Service of Summons by Publication entered 
on March 23,1987, by the Honorable David B. Dee (R. 312, 313). Proof of Publication was 
presented to the Court on or about May 1, 1987 (R. 340). Therefore, the only parties 
against whom title was not quieted in this case were Foothills and Gerald H. Bagley and 
Bagley & Company. 
5. Trial began on August 25,1988. On that date, the Court entered a Minute Entry 
stating: 
"This matter comes on before the Court for trial, with appear-
ances as shown above. The Plaintiffs and Defendants' counsel 
meet with the Court in chambers, and opening remarks are 
therefore waived. Thereupon, the Plaintiff calls Marge Tempest 
and she is sworn and examined. The respective counsel then 
agreed to submit the matter via written proffer. The matter will 
be further argued on September 9,1988, at 1:00 p.m." (Empha-
sis supplied). 
(R. 452). 
6. The Court's decision of October 25, 1988, was embodied in an "Order on 
Ownership Issues" signed by Judge Brian on October 20, 1989 (R. 895-898). At that time, 
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the Court also signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 899-904), but left open 
the issue of fair compensation for the water system. 
7. On December 1,1989, Homeowners filed a "Trial Brief and Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Valuation Issue", claiming that the Court was bound by the determination of 
the Public Service Commission of Utah as to the improvements to the subject water system 
between 1974 and 1985, which the Court ruled was the period of time for which 
improvements to the system should be valued. (R. 1023-1043). 
8. In a Minute Entry of January 31, 1990, the Court denied Homeowner's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on the valuation issue and scheduled a trial to "determine 
fair compensation" (R. 1228). 
9. Trial was held on the valuation issue on July 30, 31, and August 1,1990 (R. 1358-
1362; R. 1953-2404). Several expert witnesses on valuation were called by both parties. 
10. On August 16,1990, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision (R. 1538-1543), 
which was embodied in formal Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and "Order Regarding 
Amount Payable by Plaintiff for Subject Water System" dated October 31, 1990 (R. 1620-
1628). 
11. At that time, and not on the record, despite a request for the matter to be on 
the record by the parties, Judge Brian granted the oral motion of Foothills and Bagley to 
amend his previous Order dated October 31,1990, with a ruling that if Homeowners failed 
to pay the sum of $98,500.00 by August 15, 1991, an Order Quieting Title to the water 
system would be entered in the name of Foothills Water Company (R. 1647). 
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12. On February 5, 1991, the trial judge signed the document entitled "Order on 
Motions to Certify Order as Final and Clarification of Order" in which he ruled among 
other things: 
If the sum of $98,500.00 required to be paid to Foothills Water 
Company in paragraph 3 of the Order Regarding Amount 
Payable by Plaintiff for subject water system, dated October 31, 
1990, is not paid in full to Foothills Water Company on or 
before August 15, 1991, an Order Quieting Title to the water 
system within the boundaries of Hi-Countiy Estates Subdivision 
Phase I and the water right represented by Application No. 
33130 (59-1608) on file with the Utah State Department of 
Natural Resources, Division of Water Rights, and the Utah 
State Engineer's Office, in Foothills Water Company shall be 
entered forthwith. 
(R. 1647-1649). 
13. On August 20, 1991, Judge Brian issued his "Quiet Title Order in Favor of 
Foothills Water Company", finding that Homeowners had failed to pay the $98,500.00 on 
or before August 15, 1991, as required by his Order of October 31, 1990 (R. 1931-1936). 
14. On August 22, 1991, Homeowners filed its Notice of Appeal in this matter (R. 
1944-46). 
15. Foothills and Bagley filed their Notice of Cross-Appeal in this matter on 
September 18, 1991 (R. 1947-48). 
16. After a full hearing and oral argument in the Utah Court of Appeals, the Court 
of Appeals issued its Opinion in this matter on September 22, 1993. That opinion was a 
unanimous decision written by the Honorable Regnal W. Garff, Judge. The opinion ruled 
in Respondent Homeowners Association's favor on every single issue. The Court stated in 
its "Conclusion": 
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In conclusion, we (1) affirm the district court's initial conclu-
sion that Homeowners Association holds legal title to the water 
right, lots and system; (2) remand for the court to issue a quiet 
title order in Homeowners Association's favor with no contin-
gencies; (3) affirm the court's conclusion that Bagley is not 
entitled to any damages; (4) affirm the court's conclusion that 
Foothills Water Company's claim for slander of title be 
dismissed; (5) reverse the court's order denying summary 
judgment on the issue of compensation, acknowledging the 
PSC's order that the amount of $16,334.99 is includable in the 
rate base; (6) reverse the district court's order regarding the 
validity of the well lease agreement; and (7) reverse the court's 
order regarding distribution of water to outsiders, acknowledg-
ing the PSC's jurisdiction over that issue. 
Slip Op. at 18, 19. (See Addendum 1). 
17. Foothills petitioned the Utah Court of Appeals for Rehearing pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on October 13, 1993. 
18. The Utah Court of Appeals denied Foothills' Petition for Rehearing on 
December 7, 1993. 
19. Foothills was the only Defendant which petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for 
certiorari. The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals issued September 22, 1993, is final 
as to all parties except Homeowners and Foothills. 
20. The Utah Supreme Court granted Foothills' Petition for Writ of Certiorari in 
part on June 13, 1994. The Supreme Court entry related the following simple single 
sentence "[T]|he petition for writ of certiorari is granted only as to the jurisdiction of the 
Public Service Commission." See Addendum 2. In doing so, the Utah Supreme Court, of 
necessity, upheld this Court's decision of September 22,1993, as that decision related to this 
Court's determinations as follows: (1) affirming the district court's initial conclusion that 
Homeowners Association holds legal title to the water right, lots and system; (2) remanding 
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the case for the trial court to issue a Quiet Title Order in Homeowners' favor with no 
contingencies; (3) affirming the district court's conclusion that Bagley was not entitled to any 
damages; and (4) affirming the district court's conclusion that Foothills Water Company's 
claim for slander of title should be dismissed. (See Addendum 2). 
21. The Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion after briefing and oral argument on 
July 20, 1995, (1) reversing the Court of Appeals reversal of the district court's denial of 
Homeowners' Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of the amount of reimbursement 
owed to Foothills Water Company (which had been based on the PSC's decision); (2) 
reversing the Court of Appeals' determination that the Public Service Commission's Order 
of March 17,1986, invalidated the 1977 Well Lease Agreement between Bagley and Dansie; 
(see Addendum 3 pg. 10); (3) ruled that the Court of Appeals' reversal of an Order of the 
district court which permitted Foothills to transfer water through the system to customers 
within its service area, but outside of the subdivision, was moot based upon the subsequent 
decertification of Foothills by the Public Service Commission. (See Addendum 3 pg. 4, n. 
3). 
22. This matter was remitted to the Utah Court of Appeals on September 26, 1995, 
for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court opinion. (See Addendum 4). 
23. Homeowners filed its Motion to Decide Certain Appeal Issues on Other 
Grounds on December 7, 1995. Foothills responded to Plaintiffs Motion with its 
Memorandum on January 5,1996. Homeowners then filed its Reply to Foothills Response 
to Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion to Decide Certain Appeal Issues on Other Grounds on 
January 18, 1996. 
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24. This Court issued its "Order on Briefing" on February 8, 1996, requiring the 
parties to address the issues of (1) whether the district court correctly determined the fair 
market value of the water right, system and lots was $98,500.00 under the theoiy of 
unjustment enrichment, and (2) whether the district court correctly held that the Well Lease 
Agreement was a valid and binding encumbrance on the water system. The Court also 
asked the parties to address subissues which included whether the Utah Supreme Court's 
opinion required affirmance of the district court's ruling on fair market value of the water 
right, system and lots, and the validity of the Well Lease as an encumbrance on the system, 
and whether the Well Lease Agreement is a valid and binding encumbrance on the system, 
and in conjunction therewith, whether the Well Lease Agreement has lapsed. (See 
Addendum 9). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. While it is true that the Utah Supreme Court has reversed this Court's 
determination that the trial judge should have granted the valuation urged upon it by 
Homeowners as found by the Public Service Commission, Homeowners urge this Court to 
consider the other issues presented in its original briefe before this Court, and in the instant 
brief, as to why Homeowners should not be required to pay the sum of $98,500.00 as 
compensation to Foothills for the water system, water right, and water lots in question. This 
water system was paid for by Homeowners when they purchased their lots in the subdivision 
and was a legitimate part of the purchase price for those lots. Homeowners should thus be 
required to pay nothing to Foothills, but if they were required to pay anything, Homeowners 
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assert that they should pay no more than the sum of $27,650.00 as testified to by its expert 
in this case. 
2. Homeowners further urge this Court to reverse the decision of the trial judge 
regarding the eternal encumbrance on this water system found to be valid by the trial judge 
based upon the 1977 Well Lease and Water Transportation Agreement. That Agreement 
expired on its face on April 10, 1987, and cannot possibly constitute a valid and legal 
encumbrance on this water system. Furthermore, Homeowners were not a party to this 
agreement and have never been consulted regarding it, yet they are the ones who eternally 
must bear the burden of this agreement by providing free water to the Dansie family 
pursuant to the trial judge's initial decision. This decision by the trial judge should be 
reversed on these grounds, rather than the grounds originally found by the Court in this 
case, which was subsequently reversed by the Utah Supreme Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL JUDGE'S 
DETERMINATION AS TO THE VALUE OF THE WATER 
SYSTEM ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN THOSE FOUND 
IMPERMISSIBLE BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court found that this Court's determination that the 
value of the water system, water right and lots in this case could not be based upon a 
decision by the Public Service Commission (which occurred March 17, 1986), it is the 
position of Homeowners that this Court should reverse the trial judge's determination that 
Homeowners should pay $98,500.00 for the water system, water right and lots in question 
on other grounds as argued in its original brief before this Court. In that brief, dated 
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August 10, 1992, and which is a part of the appellate record in this matter, Homeowners 
argued that the Public Service Commission Order regarding the valuation of the water 
system should have been adopted by the trial court. Although this Court agreed, the Utah 
Supreme Court has reversed on that issue and held simply that". . . the Court of Appeals 
erred in reversing the district court's denial of the Homeowners Association's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the issue of the amount of reimbursement owed to the Water 
Company and in ordering the district court to defer to the P.S.C." (See Addendum 3, pg. 
7, 8). The Utah Supreme Court did not hold that the amount of $98,500.00 was the amount 
which Homeowners should be required to pay in this matter, but only found that the amount 
of $16,334.99, ordered by this Court, could not be upheld on the basis upon which this 
Court upheld it, i.e., a decision by the Public Service Commission of March 17, 1986. The 
Supreme Court found that the Public Service Commission's Order only determined the value 
of the water system for purposes of rate-making and not for any other purpose. 
In its initial brief before this Court, Homeowners argued not only that the value 
should be set at no more than $16,334.99 pursuant to the Public Service Commission 
determination, but also argued that the amount of $98,500.00 was an unfair and arbitrary 
amount chosen by the trial judge. Homeowners argued on pages 12-25 of its opening brief 
to the Court of Appeals in this matter that (1) Homeowners should not have been required 
to pay for the water right; (2) Homeowners have already paid for the water system and 
should not be required to pay a second time; (3) the water system in this case has little 
value to anyone but Homeowners, but at any rate is worth no more than $27,650.00. 
Homeowners' arguments in that regard are reproduced in Addendum 5 attached to this 
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brief. Those arguments are not repeated, but the Court is requested to review those 
arguments and use them as a basis for reversing the trial court's determination that 
Homeowners should pay Foothills $98,500.00 as compensation in this matter. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURTS 
FINDING THAT THE 1977 WELL LEASE AND WATER 
TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT WAS A VALID ENCUM-
BRANCE ON THE WATER SYSTEM ON GROUNDS OTHER 
THAN THE PSC ORDER OF MARCH 17. 1986. 
In its decision reversing this Court with regard to the 1977 Well Lease Agreement, 
the Supreme Court again focused on the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and 
ruled that ". . . The PSC did not have jurisdiction to invalidate the 1977 Well Lease 
Agreement as long as that agreement did not impact the rates paid by the Homeowners 
Association. Although the PSC has power to construe contracts effecting matters within its 
jurisdiction such as rate-making, ordinary contracts unrelated to such matters are outside 
of the purview of PSC jurisdiction." (See Addendum 3, pg. 10). 
Therefore, although the Utah Supreme Court reversed this Court's decision reversing 
the trial court in finding that the 1977 Well Lease Agreement was a valid encumbrance on 
the water system, it did so only on the basis that this Court relied on the March 17, 1986 
decision of the Public Service Commission as grounds for such invalidation. It is the 
argument of Homeowners that this Court should now proceed to determine whether or not 
the 1977 Well Lease Agreement should be invalidated on other grounds argued originally 
by Homeowners in its briefs before this Court, which resulted in this Court's September 22, 
1993, opinion. 
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Homeowners argued on pages 42 through 47 of its initial brief (See Addendum 7) 
and pages 40 through 43 of its Consolidated Reply Brief and Cross-Appellee's Brief (See 
Addendum 8) before this Court that this 1977 Well Lease and Water Transportation 
Agreement, attached as Addendum 15 to its opening brief before this Court and admitted 
into evidence in the trial of the matter as Plaintiffs Exhibit 11 (R. 1359, 1857-1867) (See 
Addendum 6 to this Memorandum), was invalid not only because the Public Service 
Commission found that it was "grossly unreasonable" and "showering virtually limitless 
benefits on Jessie Dansie and the members of his immediate family," but also because this 
agreement terminated on its face on April 10, 1987, and was never renewed. Since the 
agreement terminated by its own terms on that date, and no extensions of the agreement 
were ever submitted, it cannot be a valid basis for an encumbrance upon this water system 
"for time and all eternity" as essentially ruled by the trial judge in this case. 
Furthermore, Homeowners argued before this Court that they were not parties to this 
agreement; and to impose its "grossly unreasonable" terms upon them would be unfair and 
unjust, because they are the persons the Agreement was supposed to have benefited in the 
first place. 
Homeowners also argued that the Well Lease and Water line Extension Agreement 
itself provides in paragraph F.2 "Bagley will be personally responsible for lease terms and 
conditions if Assignee fails to meet the terms and conditions of the lease. No assignment, 
conveyance or sublease shall release Bagley from liabilities and obligations under this 
agreement." (See Addendum 7 pg. 45). 
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Homeowners also argued in its opening and reply briefs in this matter that the trial 
court had failed to enter adequate findings regarding its decision that the 1977 Well Lease 
Agreement should be a valid and fully binding encumbrance on the water system as long as 
the water system "exists and is operative." Homeowners pointed out that the Court had also 
indicated in its Finding of Fact on this issue that "that encumbrance does not in any way 
legally burden the water system or the owner or operator of the water system." Homeown-
ers argued that this Finding of Fact is internally inconsistent and thus incomprehensible. 
Furthermore, Homeowners argued that Finding of Fact No. 5 (the Finding of Fact referred 
to herein) is not a legitimate Finding of Fact, but constituted a Conclusion of Law. 
Homeowners pointed out that the Conclusion of Law reached by the Court on this subject 
seemed inconsistent with its Finding of Fact No. 5. In that Conclusion of Law, the judge 
referred to a water right, but the 1977 Well Lease Agreement nowhere mentions a water 
right. It is the lease of a well! (See Addendum 7 and 8). 
CONCLUSION 
While it is true that the Utah Supreme Court has reversed this Court's determination 
that the trial judge should have granted the valuation urged upon it by Homeowners as 
found by the Public Service Commission, Homeowners urge this Court to consider the other 
issues presented in its original briefs before this Court as to why Homeowners should not 
be required to pay the sum of $98,500.00 as compensation to Foothills for the water system, 
water right and water lots in question. This water system was paid for by homeowners when 
they purchased their lots in the subdivision and was a legitimate part of the purchase price 
for those lots. Homeowners should thus be required to pay nothing to Foothills, but if they 
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were required to pay anything, Homeowners assert that they should pay no more than the 
sum of $27,650.00 as testified to by its expert in this case. 
Furthermore, Homeowners urge this Court to reverse the decision of the trial judge 
regarding the eternal encumbrance on this water system found to be valid by the trial judge 
based upon the 1977 Well Lease and Water Transportation Agreement. That agreement 
expired on its face on April 10, 1987, and cannot possibly constitute a valid and legal 
encumbrance on this water system. Furthermore, Homeowners were not a party to this 
agreement and have never been consulted regarding it, yet they are the ones who eternally 
must bear the burden of this agreement by providing free water to the Dansie family 
pursuant to the trial judge's initial decision. This decision by the trial judge should be 
reversed on these grounds, rather than the grounds originally found by this Court in this 
case. 
It is to be emphasized that the Utah Supreme Court, in reversing this Court's 
opinion, dealt only with two issues relating to the jurisdiction of the Public Service 
Commission. The Supreme Court did not uphold the trial judge's decision, but merely 
reversed this Court's basis for reversing the trial judge as to the two issues discussed herein. 
This Court must make a decision, before it remands the case to the trial court, as to 
whether or not the other grounds presented by Homeowners for invalidation of this Well 
Lease Agreement are valid before it can uphold the trial judge's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of April, 1996. 
__________ 
_ ]R. KELLEk 
Atto^ey/for PlaintiffyAppellants 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Utah Court of Appeals 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN TEE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— — o o O o o — -
SEP 2 2 1993 
•/• MaiyT.Moown 
/ Cane at tfc* Court 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Associat ion, a Utah, 
corporation , 
P l a i n t i f f , Appellant, and 
Cross-Appellee, 
v . 
Baclev S Company, a Utah 
corporation; J. Rodney Dansie; 
Gerald Baclav: Hi-Country 
Estates , Inc . , a d i s so lved 
Utah corporation; Keith 
Spencer; Charles E. Lewton; 
and unknown persons claiming 
an in teres t in Hi-Country 
Estates Subdivision, 
Defendants, Appel lees , 
and Cross-Appellants. 
F o o t h i l l s Water Company, a 
Utah corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
Appellee, and Cross-
Appellant, 
v. 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Association, a Utah 
corporation; W. Norman Sims; 
and William P. Turner, 
Counterclaim Defendants, 
and Acoellees. 
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Attorneys: Larry R. Keller, Salt LaJce" City, for Appellants 
Ralph J. Marsh, Val R. AntczaJc, and T. Patrick Casey, 
for Appellees 
Before Judges Garff,1 Greenwood, and Orme. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Appellant Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association 
(Homeowners Association) appeals from a final order, which 
ultimately granted quiet title to a water system, water right, 
and property lot in favor of appellee Foothills Water Company, 
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in part. 
FACTS 
We draw the facts from the parties' stipulated statement of 
facts, which the court adopted in its findings of fact. 
In 1970, appellee, Gerald H. Bagley purchased the 
undeveloped real property involved in this action from Tony and 
Bette Lou Nicolerti pursuant to a deferred-payment contract. 
Also in 1970, Bagley, Charles E. Lewnon, and others formed Hi-
Country Estates, Inc., a Utah corporation. This corporation, 
which was involuntarily dissolved in 1976, was the general 
partner for Hi-Country Estates, Second. Bagley later assigned 
his contract with the Nicolettis to Hi-Country Estates, Second, a 
limited partnership, in which he was one of the partners. Later 
in 1970, the Hi-Country Estates, Second partnership, along with 
Zions First National Bank Trust Department and the Nicolettis, 
entered into an agreement under which the bank would take title 
to the property, remit payment on the contract to the Nicolettis, 
and thereafter deed the property to purchasers of lots within the 
subdivision. The partnership subdivided the property into the 
Hi-Country Estates Subdivision. The partnership installed a 
water system to supply water to the subdivision, and then 
commenced to sell lots to the public. 
In 1971, Bagley and the other partners sold their interests 
in the project to Lewton and withdrew from the project. Keith 
Spencer later joined Lewton as an owner and manager of the 
project. 
In 1973 and 1974, Lewton and Spencer sold the water system, 
along with all unsold lots in the subdivision, back to Bagley, 
who then resumed operation of the water system. Bagley made 
substantial repairs and capital improvements to the system, 
including constructing a second storage tank, adding pumps and 
lines, replacing booster lines, and in 1977, connecting the 
1. Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff, sitting by special appointment 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (1992). 
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system to an additional well leased from Jesse J. Dansie (the 
Glazier Weil Water Right). 
From 1972 to October 1985, Bagley operated and maintained 
the water system in the capacity of (1) an individual, or (2) a 
general partner of 3agiey and Company, or (2) a limited partner 
of Foothills Water Company. During those years, he incurred 
total cash losses of $487,510.00 in operating, maintaining, and 
improving the water system. In 1976, Hi-Country Estates, Inc. 
was involuntarily dissolved. 
In 1977, 3agiey entered into a well lease agreement with 
Jesse J. Dansie to supply water from the Dansie well to the water 
system. This lease provided that Dansie and his family would 
continue to receive water from the well, as long as the system 
was operable. The lease provided that it could be renewed on 
April" 10, 1987 "on terms to be agreed to by Bagley and Dansie.11 
In 1982, Hcmecwners Association received tax notices from 
Salt LaJce County requesting payment of delinquent and current 
taxes on the water system. Homeowners Association forwarded 
these notices to Bagley with a letter stating it did not own the 
water system and thus Bagley was responsible for the taxes. In. 
1984, Bagley paid $15,000.00 in delinquent taxes to redeem the 
system, after the county had scheduled a tax sale. Even though 
Bagley paid the taxes, the county issued the tax deed to the two 
water tank lots in the name of Homeowners Association. 
In Marcn 1985, Hcmecwners Association brought an action to 
quiet title in the water system, the Glazier Well Water Right, 
and the two water tanic lots. Bagley counterciaimed, praying for 
reimbursement of all sums expended in the construction and 
installation of the water system and all costs and expenses 
incurred in the operation and maintenance of the water system win 
the event [Homeowners Association] is found to be the owners of 
the water system." 3agiey adopted one of the association's 
alternative theories: that he acted as a constructive trustee or 
resulting trustee of the disputed property. 
In the same action, Foothills Water Company sought damages 
for slander of title from Spencer, Lewton, Homeowners 
Association, and from W. Norman Sims and William P. Turner, 
members of the association. It also sought damages similar to 
those sought by Bagley. The trial court dismissed Foothills 
Water Company's claim for slander of title on October 20, 1989, 
for "lack of proof.11 
In June of 1985, Turner asked J.R. Moss, a trust officer of 
Zions BanJc to prepare a quit-claim deed to the two water tank 
parcels on the property with Homeowners Association as a grantee. 
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Ke also asked Moss to request quit-claim deeds from Spencer and 
Lewton, former officers of the~defunct Hi-Country Estates, Inc. 
and of Hi-Country Estates, Second. Moss prepared the deeds for 
the tank lots for Zicns's signature and had them recorded. Moss 
prepared other quit-claim deeds and forwarded them to Spencer and 
Lewton, who signed them on behalf of Hi-Country Estates, Inc. and 
Hi-Country Estates, Second, and returned them to Moss, who had 
them recorded. 
On October 21, 1985, Bagley transferred ownership of the 
water system to Dansie in lieu of payment of sums due him on a 
previous obligation. This transfer was made via Bagley executing 
an assignment transferring ail the outstanding stock of Foothills 
Water Company to Dansie. 
In January 1586, in a Public Service Commission (PSC) 
hearing regarding rats base, Homeowners Association argued that 
Foothills Water Company should not include the cost of the water 
system as a capital investment in its rate base. The PSC 
determined that only a small portion of the water company's 
capital investment could be included in the utility's rate base, 
pending resolution of the ownership dispute in district court. 
At the same time, Homeowners Association agreed to pay the 
property 'taxes on the water system directly, in part to avoid 
those taxes being included as an expense in setting water rates.2 
On March 17, 1586, the PSC issued a final report and order, 
determining the extent- to which the improvements in the- water 
system could be included in the rate base. Those findings 
included: (1) "Bagley was selling lots at a profit until 1976;" 
(2) "the improvements made between 1977 and 1980 were to have 
been provided by Sagley as part of the original system;" and (3) 
only $15,234.99 of the improvements were includable in the rate 
base as legitimate costs of improvement to the system. 
Trial in the district court on the issue of ownership began 
August 25, 1988. The court conferred with counsel off the 
record, asking them to stipulate to some of the facts and proffer 
evidence pertaining to the disputed issues. 
The parties then agreed to brief the issues and submit them 
for decision. The court set the due date for briefs for noon on 
September 9, 1988, and' it set oral argument on the matter for 
2. The Utah Supreme Court has previously affirmed that local 
taxes may be passed on to consumers by way of the rate base. See 
Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Co, .v. Salt Lake Citv. 596 P.2d 
649, 651 (Utah 1979}. 
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1:00 p.m. the same day. This hearing was continued several 
times. It was finally held October 25, 1983. 
At the August 25, 1988 hearing, Foothills Water Company's 
counsel mentioned a "potential n&&d for witnesses." The court 
responded that counsel should notify the court "by a telephonic 
conference if it appears that there are proffered facts that 
cannot be stipulated to." The court noted it would render an 
••opinion on the record, not in the form of a memorandum 
decision." It then released all witnesses. The court noted that 
counsel should contact the court via telephonic conference in the 
event "problems arise in any way." 
On October 14, 1988, Homeowners Association, Foothills Water 
Company, and Bagley filed a stipulated statement of undisputed 
facts and disputed contentions." To support its position 
regarding the*disputed issues, Foothills Water Company prepared 
and submitted an extensive set of proffers of witness testimony. 
The other parties did not file any proffers. 
After several postponements, hearing on the issue of 
ownership was held October 25, 1988. The court determined that 
Homeowners Association "is the legal owner of the disputed water 
system." The court made findings supporting this conclusion 
based on the parties' stipulated statement of facts and the 
exhibits attached thereto. The court's findings did not adopt 
any of the facts or theories set forth in Foothills Water 
Company's proffers. The court concluded that it would quiet 
title in favor of the association "only upon payment in full by 
[Homeowners Association] to [Foothills'Water Company] of the 
Court's reimbursement order for improvements by [Foothills Water 
Company] to [Homeowners Association's! water system for the years 
1974 to
 1985." 
In determining that Homeowners Association owned the water 
system, rights, and lot, the court relied on the following 
documents: 
Two 1975 quitclaim deeds from Hi-Country 
Estates, Inc., and Hi-Country Estate Second,* 
to [Homeowners Association], those deeds 
conveying all common areas in the subdivision 
to [Homeowners Association]. 
A 1984 recorded tax deed from Salt Lake 
County to [Homeowners Association] conveying 
all the water tank lots in the disputed 
subdivision to [Homeowners Association]. 
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A 1985 recorded deed from Hi-Country 
Estates, Inc., to [Homeowners Association], 
conveying the water tank lots to [Homeowners 
Association]• 
A 1985 recorded deed from Hi-Country 
Estates Second to [Homeowners Association], 
conveying the water tank lots to [Homeowners 
Association]. 
Two 1985 recorded quitclaim deeds from 
Zicns Bank and Trust, trustee for the 
property in the subdivision, to [Homeowners 
Association], conveying the water tank lots 
to [Homeowners Association]. 
An assignment from Hi-Country Estates, 
Inc., to [Homeowners Association], of the 
disputed water rights. 
An acknowledgment by the State 
Engineer's Division of Water Rights that 
[Homeowners Association] is owner of the 
water rights, more specifically, water right 
referred to in this action as the Glazier 
Well Water Right, 
After ruling from the bench, the court suggested that the 
parties attempt to stipulate to the amount due Foothills Water 
Company. "If you are unable to do that, the court will schedule 
an evidentiary hearing, take testimony, and make the decision on 
the matter." 
When asked about unaddressed issues such as the 
counterclaims, attorney fees, and other issues, the court 
responded that it would take such issues under advisement, hoping 
that in the mean time, the parties would attempt to resolve those 
issues "with the umbrella issue of reasonable reimbursement•" 
The court then set a time for an evidentiary hearing for the 
issue of reimbursement. 
The court's ruling from the October 25, 1988 hearing was set 
forth in findings of fact and conclusions of law, signed October 
20, 1989 by the court and approved by counsel for the parties. 
Regarding the October 25, 1988 hearing on the issue of ownership, 
the court noted that "any objections to the content of the 
Court's ruling on the resulting findings, conclusions and order 
shall be addressed in a motion for reconsideration of such 
ruling, findings, conclusions and order and not as objections to 
form.n 
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Accordingly, on October 30, 1989, Foothills Water Company 
moved the court to reconsider, or to set aside the order on the 
basis that the proceedings did not afford it due process, did not 
present it with an opportunity to properly present its position 
according to the rules of civil procedure and of evidence, and 
did not comport with the method agreed upon- Foothills Water 
Company also claimed that the findings and order were not 
supported by sufficient evidence. 
Further, on December 1, 1989, Homeowners Association moved 
that the court recognize and be bound by the PSC's determination 
regarding the value of the improvements to the water system made 
between 1974 and 1985. 
The court heard Foothills Water Company's motions on 
December 28, 1989, and issued an order denying them and restating 
that its October 20, 1989 order would be the final order of the 
court regarding ownership. The court held that Foothills Water 
Company had waived its right to an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of ownership because it never contacted the court to 
arrange such a hearing as contemplated in the court's directive 
from the bench during the August* 25, 1988 hearing. 
On January 8, 1990, Foothills Water Company and Dansie again 
moved for reconsideration or for amendment of the court's 
previous findings, conclusions, and order. On January 17, 1990; 
the court again reiterated its prior order of October 20, 1989. 
On January 31, 1990, the court scheduled a trial to 
"determine fair compensation. " After several delays, an 
evidentiary hearing was held July 30, 31, and August 1, 1990, to 
determine the amount of reimbursement due Foothills Water 
Company. Evidence was submitted showing that Bagley, since 
taking the water system bacJc in 1974, had spent 5227,851.00 on 
capital improvements to the water system and had incurred 
5250,659.00 in operating losses while operating the system for 
the benefit of Homeowners Association. The evidence regarding 
the present value of the system was disputed. 
On August 16, 1990, the court issued its memorandum 
decision, later embodied in formal findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and order "regarding amount payable by [Homeowners 
Association] for subject water system," dated October 31, 1990. 
The court ruled that the Dansie well lease agreement was a valid 
and binding encumbrance on the water system. The court also held 
that Bagley was not entitled to any compensation for operating 
losses and capital improvements relating to the water system, 
primarily because he had assigned ail his rights to Foothills 
Water Company. 
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The court found that the "water system . . . and the water 
right at: issue . . . , including improvements made, property 
taxes paid, repairs to the system and operating losses, have a 
combined net value of $93,500." The court ordered Homeowners 
Association to pay Foothills Water Company $98,500.00 for the 
value of the water system before it would enter the quiet title 
order. The court ordered the association to pay the sum by no 
later than August 15, 1991, with the unpaid balance being 
interest free* 
On October 21, 1990, the parties met with the judge for an 
informal conference regarding a motion to certify the courts 
orders as final. At that time, and not on the record, despite 
the parties' request for the matter to be on the record,3 the 
judge granted the oral motion of Foothills Water Company and 
3agley zo amend its previous order dated October 21, 1990. The 
court ruled that in the event Homeowners Association failed to 
pay the sum of $98,500.00 by August 15, 1991, the court would 
then enrer an order quiering title to the water system in favor 
of Foothills Water Company. The court formally entered this 
amended order February 5, 1991. 
On May 22, 1991, Homeowners Association filed a "Motion to 
Pay $98,500.00 into an Interest-Bearing Account Under Control of 
the Court,11 which motion was granted. The court denied the 
association7s other motion to enter an order requiring that the 
$98,500.00 be returned to it in the event the appellate court 
reversed the trial court's quiet title order in its favor. 
Because it did not wane to risk the money, Homeowners Association 
refused to pay the $98,500.00. 
On August 20, 1991, after being notified by Foothills Water 
Company that the $98,500.00 had not been paid to it as provided, 
the court entered a quiet title order in favor of Foothills Water 
Company. 
Homeowners Association appeals, seeking reversal of the 
quiet title order in favor of"Foothills Water Company, and 
reversal of the determination that it was required to pay 
$98,500.00 as a condition precedent to receiving quiet title. It 
also seeks an order requiring the trial court to quiet title in 
its favor without the encumbrance (the well lease) referred to in 
its final order. 
2. District courts are courts of record. Utah Const, art. VIII, 
§ 1. We are perplexed at the court's refusal to make a record of 
this motion and decision. See Briacs v. Holcomb. 740 P.2d 281, 
282-82 (Utah App. 1987). 
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Bagley also appeals, claiming the trial court should have 
apportioned part of the reimbursement damages to him because he 
expended money for capital improvements to the water system, 
along with costs of operation and maintenance. He also claims 
entitlement to a security interest in the water system. 
The initial issues are: (1) whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in disallowing an evidentiary hearing on the issue 
of ownership; (2) whether the court erred in initially quieting 
title in favor of Homeowners Association; including (3) whether 
the court was empowered to maJce its order contingent on the 
association paying $98,500.00 to Foothills Water Company; (4) 
whether the court correctly determined that Bagley was not 
entitled to damages; and (5) whether the court correctly 
determined that Foothills Water Company had not presented a prima 
-facie case to establish slander of title. 
The remaining issues involve zhe jurisdiction of the PSC vis 
a vis the jurisdiction of the district court. We review those 
issues after we disoose of the initial issues. 
PROCEDURE 
The posture of this case, at least regarding the issue of 
ownership, is similar to that of a summary judgment because the., 
court had no evidence before it other than the parties7 
stipulated statement of facts. While the court also had before 
it Foothills Water Company's proffers, the court never considered 
them because Foothills Water Company failed to timely request a 
hearing on the disputed issues. The court had ordered, pursuant 
to the parties' agreement, that the parties attempt to submit the 
matter via stipulation and proffer. *The parties agreed to submit 
a statement of stipulated facts and contentions, to proffer 
disputed issues, and to request an evidentiary hearing, if any of 
them felt one was warranted. They agreed to submit their 
stipulation and to argue their positions on a date certain, which 
date was postponed several times. The parties finally argued the 
matter on October 25, 1988. 
While the court na^er set a deadline for requesting an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of ownership, logic dictates 
that the deadline could be no later than argument and submission 
of the issue. In other words, the fact that none of the parties 
requested an evidentiary hearing prior to October 25, 1988, the 
date of oral argument, suggests that, as of that date, they saw 
no nead for such a hearing and thus waived it. 
Thus, when Foothills Water Company moved the court to 
reconsider its refusal to grant an evidentiary hearing, the court 
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did not err in denying the motion because the parties, by their 
inaction, had waived their right to a hearing. 
QUIZT TITLE TO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION 
Foothills Water Company claims the trial court erred in its 
October 25, 1989 order granting quiet title in favor of 
Homeowners Association. It also claims the court erred in 
issuing a ruling entirely independent of its proffers* 
The parties stipulated that, prior to 1985, title to the 
water rignr and to the water tank lots "could still be considered 
to be in the name of Zicns Bank or Hi-Country Estates, Inc." 
Given this stipulation, and given that quit-claim deeds were 
executed in favor of Homeowners Association by the principals of 
Hi-Country Estates, Inc. en behalf of those entities, and by 
trust officers of the bank, the court did not err in concluding 
that Homeowners Association held legal title to the water right, 
lots, and system. 
CONTINGENT QUIET TITLE ORDER 
Homeowners Association claims the trial court erred in 
conditioning its quiet title upon its paying $98,500.00 to 
Foothills Water Company* It also claims the court erred in 
issuing a quiet title_in favor of Foothills Water Company upon 
the association7s failure to pay the amount set. 
Utah's quiet title statute requires a court to allow as a 
setoff or counterclaim the value of the improvements provided by 
one, who in good faith, is "holding under color of title 
adversely to the claims of the [owner]." Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-
5 (1992). It does not provide for a contingent quiet title. 
Moreover, a contingent quiet title is antithetical to the nature 
of the action because a court issues a quiet title by virtue of 
the claimant's strength of title rather than by reason of the 
weakness of the opponent's title. Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch 
Cor?., 659 ?.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Utah 1983). 
Here, the court first quieted title in Homeowners 
Association and then took title away from it by making the 
association's quiet title contingent on its paying a set amount 
to Foothills Water Company. We find no legal justification or 
authority for the court setting such a contingency on Homeowners 
Association's quiet title. Further, the court did not allow 
Foothills Water Company a mere setoff or counterclaim for the 
value of its good faith improvements. Thus, the court erred in 
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quieting title in Foothills Water Company's favor as a default 
position for the association's refusal to pay the amount set. 
We therefore reverse the contingent quiet title order and 
remand for the court to issue a quiet title order in favor of 
Homeowners Association. We next address whether the quiet title 
may be subject to a setoff or counterclaim as a result of 
Bagley's claim. Later in this opinion, we address the general 
issue of Foothills Water Company's award as we discuss the role 
of the Public Service Commission. 
BAGLEY'S DAMAGES 
Bagley cross appeals, claiming the trial court erred in 
ordering reimbursement to Foothills Water Company, but not to 
him. Bagley claims no evidence supported excluding him from the 
reimbursement award. 
The parties stipulated that on October 31, 1985, Bagley, 
pursuant to an assignment, transferred to Dansie all of his stock 
in Foothills Water Company. The stipulation, which incorporated 
Bagley's assignment, noted that Bagley transferred "all right, 
title and interest in any and all water rights, equipment, 
easements, rights of way or property they have or may have in or 
to or associated with the water system . . . ff 
"An assignment merely sets over or transfers the interest of 
one party in certain property to another." Tanner v. Lawler, 6 
Utah 2d 84, 205 P.2d 882", 835 (1957). Accord Wisccmoe v. 
Lockhart Co.. 608 P.2d 236, 233 (Utah 1980) ("an assignee takes 
nothing more by his assignment than his assignor had11)". 
Given the parties/ stipulation regarding the terms of the 
assignment, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that "all [of 
Bagley's] claims, rights, title and interest in said water system 
and water right merged with those of defendant J. Rodney Dansie 
and defendant Foothills Water Company." Thus, because Bagley had 
no rights in the system after October 31, 1985, he is not 
entitled to compensation for amounts paid by him prior to his 
transfer. 
SLANDER OF TITLE 
Foothills Water Company, in its cross-appeal, claims the 
trial court erred in dismissing its claims for slander of title 
because it had proffered to the court that Homeowners 
Association's agents, Turner and Sims, sought and obtained deeds 
to the "water tank lots" and an assignment of the water right, 
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and attempted to use the documents to illegally obtain control 
and ownership of the system. 
An action for slander of title "consists of the willful 
recordation or publication of untrue material that is disparaging 
to another's title." Jack B. Parson Cos, v. Nield, 751 P.2d 
1131, 1134 (Utah 1988). Accord First Sec. Bank v. Banberrv 
Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989); Bass v. Planned 
Management Servs. . Inc., 761 P.2d 566, 563 (Utah 1988). 
Heref the trial court, on October 20, 1989, concluded that 
the "counterclaim by Foothills Water Company is hereby dismissed 
for lack of proof.11 Given that the court had granted Homeowners 
Association title, it implicitly ruled that the association acted 
under color of title, and therefore acted without malice. That 
is, by determining that Homeowners Association had title, which 
determination we affirm, the court could not have also ruled that 
the association had committed an act that was "disparaging to 
another's title." Jack 3, Parson, 751 P.2d at 1134 (emphasis 
added). Thus the trial court correctly dismissed the claim. 
REMAINING ISSUES 
The remaining issues involve the jurisdiction of the Public 
Service Commission vis a vis the jurisdiction of the district 
court- These issues include (1) whether the court erred in 
refusing to grant summary judgment on the issue of Foothills 
Water Company's compensation; (2) whether the court erred in 
determining the well lease was valid and binding on the owner of 
the water system; and (3) whether the court erred in requiring 
Homeowners Association to allow Foothills Water Company to 
transport water through its system to customers outside the 
subdivision. 
Homeowners Association claims the court erred in refusing to 
summarily rule on these issues. In the alternative, the 
association argues that this court should remand these issues to 
the PSC for determination. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION JURISDICTION 
The parties dispute whether the PSC and not the district 
court should properly determine the value of the system payable 
by Homeowners Association and the value of improvements made 
between 1974 and 1985. Because the issue of the jurisdiction of 
the PSC vis a vis the jurisdiction of the district court is 
crucial to several issues in this case, we discuss it at length. 
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In an order dared March 17, 1986, the PSC determined that 
Foothills Water Ccmcany had been operating an uncertified public 
utility.4 
The PSC is empowered to "ascertain tiie value of the property 
of every public utility in this state and every fact which in 
its judgment: may or does have any bearing on such value." Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-4-21 (1990). Moreover, tiie PSC's valuation of a 
public utility "shall be considered the actual value of the 
properties of"said public utilities in Utah, unless otherwise 
changed after hearings by order of the commission." Id. 
Likewise, the PSC may hold hearings to determine the value of 
public utiiitv orcterties and imorovements. Utah Code Ann. § 54-
7-19(1) (a) and ~(2) "(a). 
The essential objectives of the PSC's supervision are 
twofold: (1) to assure a public utility's "continued ability to 
be able to serve the customers who rely upon [it] for essential 
services and products"; and (2) to balance "the interest of 
having financially sound utilities that provide essential goods 
and services against the public interest of having goods and 
services made available without discrimination and on the .basis 
of reasonable costs." Garkane Power Ass'n v. Public Serv. 
Comn'n, 631 P.2d 1196r 1207 (Utah 1984) (per curiam). 
The PSC is empowered to set utility rates following 
hearings. Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-4(1) and 54-7-12(1) and (2); 
4. Utah Cede Ann. § 54-2-1 (Supp. 1993) provides that public 
utilities include water systems and water corporations. The term 
"water corporation" includes 
every corporation and person, their lessees, 
trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, 
operating
 f or managing any water system for 
public service within this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 (34) . The term "water system" includes 
ail reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, diJces 
headgates, pipes, flumes, canals, structures, 
and appliances, and ail other real estate, 
fixtures, and personal property owned, 
controlled, operated, or managed in 
connection with or to facilitate the 
diversion, development, storage, supply, 
distribution, sale, furnishing, carriage, 
appointment, apportionment, or measurement of 
water for power, fire protection, irrigation, 
reclamation, or manufacturing, or for 
municipal, domestic, or other beneficial use. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(35). 
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Department of 5us. 5eg. v. Public Serv. Coina'n. 720 P.2d 420, 420 
(Utah 1986) . "In determining an appropriate rate, the PSC 
considers the utility's historical income and cost data, as well 
as predictions of future costs and revenues, and arrives at a 
rate which is projected as being adequate to cover costs and give 
the utility's shareholders a fair return on equity." Id. 
Utah courts have long held that the PSC may regulate public 
utility rates, even when doing so requires altering contractual 
relationships. Utah Hcral Co, v. Public Utilities CoTnm'n, 204 P. 
511, 515 (1922); Utah Copper Co. v. Public Utilities Comn'n, 203 
•P. 627, 621 (Utah 1921) . The public interest in access to 
utilities, and in fair and just rates, justifies such regulation 
and justifies the altering of contractual relationships. 
Arkansas Natural Gas Co, v. Arkansas R-R. Common. 261 U.S. 379, 
383, 43 S. Ct. 287, 283 (1923). "It is the intervention of the 
public interest which justifies and, at the same time conditions 
[the PSC's] exercise.* Id.5 
Thus, to determine whether the district court or the PSC 
should properly determine the value of capital improvements 
during the relevant period, we analyze whether such a 
determination invoices the public interest and serves the 
objectives of the PSC. See id. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Homeowners Association claims the trial court erred by not 
granting summary judgment on the issue of the amount owed to 
Foothills Water Company. The association claims summary judgment 
was appropriate because (1) the PSC is uniquely qualified and has 
jurisdiction to value the sysram in this instance where the 
dispute involves the ratepayers; (2) the PSC has already 
determined that the association paid for the value of the utility 
at the time the individual members purchased their lots; and (3) 
the PSC has already determined the degree to which the value of 
improvements made between 1974 and 1985 could be included in the 
rate base. 
Here, the trial court, using a theory of unjust enrichment, 
found that Homeowners Association should reimburse Foothills 
5. We acJcnowledge that "not every contract entered into by a 
public utility is subject to the jurisdiction of the PSC." 
Garfcane Power. 631 P.2d at 1207. For example, "contracts dealing 
with the ordinciry conduct of a business, are contracts that could 
be liticated only in a district court and not before the PSC." 
Id. 
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Water Company $98,500.00 for the value of the "entire water 
system, the improvements made thereon from 1974 to 1985 and the 
water right." "in other words, the trial court not only evaluated 
improvements, but it evaluated the entire system and imposed 
payment for the whole system. 
Here, the valuation of the system and its capital 
improvements invokes the public interest of the ratepayers (in 
this case, the individual ratepayers who comprise the 
association) and their access to utilities and fair and just 
rates. See Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas R.R. Conm'n. 261 
U.S. 379, 383, 43 S. Ct. 387, 388 (1923). Moreover, this case is 
not confined merely to "the ordinary conduct of a business . . . 
that could be litigated only in a district court and not before 
the PSC." Garkane Power Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 631 P.2d 
1196, 1207 (Utah 1984) (per curiam). In short, the public 
interest of the ratepayers and their fair access to utilities 
justifies the exercise of the PSC's jurisdiction. See Arkansas 
Natural Gas. 261 U.S. at 383, 43 S. Ct. at 388. 
The PSC determined that "the improvements made between 1977 
and 1980 were to have been provided by Bagley as part of the 
original system." In Re Foothills Water. Case No. 85-2010-01 
(Utah PSC 1986). The PSC concluded that only $16,334.99 was 
allowable as legitimate costs of improvements to the system that 
were not recovered in the sale of lots originally. 
"In all collateral actions or proceedings the orders and 
decisions of the commission which have become final shall be 
conclusive." Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-14 (1990); accord North Salt 
Lake v. St. Joseph Water i Irrigation Co.. 222 P.2d 577, 585 
(Utah 1950). 
We therefore hold that the PSC determination regarding the 
amount Foothills Water Company could recover for its improvements 
is binding. Accordingly, we agree with the PSC that the 
$16,334.99 is includable in the rate base. 
WELL LEASE ENCUMBRANCE 
Homeowners Association claims the trial court erred in 
determining that the well lease entered into between Bagley and 
Dansie was a valid and binding encumbrance. The association 
claims the court had no jurisdiction to determine the validity of 
an encumbrance on a public utility. In a similar vein, 
Homeowners Association claims the court erred in failing to hold 
that the PSC's determination precludes Foothills Water Company 
from asserting the validity of the well lease agreement. In the 
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alternative, the association claims the lease did not constitute 
an encumbrance because it had lapsed. 
The PSC is empowered to "ascertain the value of the property 
of ever/ public utility in this state and every fact which in its 
judgment may or does have any bearing on such value." Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-4-21 (1990). Moreover the PSC#s valuation of a public 
utility "shall be considered the actual value of the properties 
of said public utilities in Utah unless otherwise changed after 
hearings by order of the commission." Id. 
"Any transfer of a utility asset should be for fair market 
value so an appropriate benefit therefrom will redound to the 
credit of the ratepayers." Committee of Consumer Servs. v. 
Public Serv. Coim'Ti/595 P.2d 871, 378 (Utah 1979), cert, denied, 
sub ncm. Mountain Fuel Suoolv Co. v. Committee of Consumer 
Servs.. 444 U.S. 1014, 100 S. Ct. 664-65 (1980). The PSC must 
approve any such transfer based upon a determination as to 
"whether the transaction is detrimental to the ratepayer, and 
whether it is in the public interest." Id. 
The issue of whether the well lease is a valid encumbrance 
on the property is one which has "bearing on such value [of a 
public utility]." Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-21. The issue is also 
one of fact regarding whether the Dansie family has been granted 
"any preference or advantage" and whether Homeowners Association 
has been subjected to "any prejudice or disadvantage." Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-3-8. In short, this issue is within the PSC's 
exclusive jurisdiction. Moreover, it is one the PSC has already 
determined. 
The PSC determined, in an order dated March 17, 198 6, that 
the well lease agreement was "grossly unreasonable" and that it 
had the effecc of "showering virtually limitless benefits on 
Jesse Oansie and the members of his immediate family." The PSC 
found the agreement "makes Bagley personally responsible to 
fulfill the terms and conditions of the lease, whether or not a 
water company is created to which Bagley conveys or assigns the 
Weil Lease Agreement." The PSC found it "unjust and unreasonable 
to expect Foothills7 53 active customers to support the entire 
burden of the Well Lease Agreement." Based on these findings, 
the PSC ordered Foothills Water Company to "obtain approval from 
this Commission before entering into any future lease or sales 
agreements for the provision of water to Foothills's service area 
or any amendment to or assignment of any lease or sales agreement 
that is now in force or effect." The PSC then held that its 
statutory duty prevented it from imposing the terms of the lease 
upon Homeowners Association and other present and future 
customers. 
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The PSC's 1936 order allowed Foothills Water Company to 
continue to supply water to the Dansie family conditioned upon 
payment of the"cost of delivery by someone other than the 
customers in Foothills Water Company's service area. The order 
also required that Foothills Water Company bring any subsequent 
lease to the Commission for approval.6 
Despite these orders of the PSC, the district court found 
that the*1977 well lease between Bagley and Dansie was a valid^ 
and binding encumbrance on the water system, and thus the Dansie 
family was"entitled to draw, without charge, water from the 
system's Dansie well, "in the amount of either twelve million 
gallons per year or such larger amount as the excess capacity of 
the system shall permit, as long as the system exists and is 
operative." The court found that such encumbrance "does not in 
any way legally burden the water system or the owner or operator 
of the water system." 
Given the PSC's jurisdiction to determine whether a public 
utility may be so encumbered, and given the PSC's March 17, 1986 
order requiring Foothills Water Company to obtain PSC approval to 
obtain any extension of the well lease agreement, we reverse the 
district court's order insofar as it pertains to the validity of 
the well lease agreement. 
TRANSPORTATION OF WATER TO OUTSIDERS 
Homeowners Association claims the trial court erred in 
issuing an order requiring it to allow Foothills Water Company to 
transport water through its system to customers outside the 
subdivision. 
The district court issued an interlocutory order permitting 
Foothills Water Company to transfer water through the system to 
its customers within its service area but outside the 
subdivision, so long as these customers pay a fair use fee. This 
order was based on a single finding: "Foothills Water Company 
and its predecessors have used the system throughout its 
existence to serve customers outside"the Hi-Country Estates Phase 
6. Foothills Water Company has never sought Commission approval 
of the terms of the well lease. More recently, on November 30, 
1992, the PSC determined that all costs of the well lease 
agreement, which exceed the costs of the alternative source, are 
unreasonable and must be carried by Foothills Water Company if it 
decides to continue the lease. The record shows that even though 
the lease provided that the parties could extend it, they did not 
"do so. 
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I Subdivision." Apparently the court based this "finding" on the 
parties7 stipulation that "Foothills is, and has been since 1985, 
rhe current certificated utility serving the Subdivision (and 
certain other surrounding properties)." 
First, this stipulated fact does not necessarily support the 
legal conclusion that Foothills Water Company may transport water 
outside the subdivision. More importantly, the issue involves 
the essential objectives of the PSC's supervision. Those 
objectives are: (1) to assure a public utility's "continued 
ability to be able to serve the customers who rely upon them for 
•essential services and products;" and (2) to balance "the 
interest of having financially sound utilities that provide 
essential goods and services against the public interest of 
having goods and services made available without discrimination 
and on the basis of reasonable costs." Garkane Power Ass'n v. 
Public Serv. Comn'Ti. 531 P.2d 1196, 1207 (Utah 1984) (per 
curiam) . See also Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas R.R. 
Comm'n, 261 U.S. 279, 382, 43 S. Ct. 387, 388 (1923); North Salt 
Lake v. St. Joseph Warar & Irrigation Co. , 118 Utah 600, 223 P.2d 
577, 582 (Utah 1950) (the PSC is empowered to determine relative 
rights and obligations between utility and consumer). 
Thus, the issue of whether or not a utility is entitled tor 
provide water to a group of customers falls within the 
jurisdiction of the-PSC. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion ve (l) affirm the district court's initial 
conclusion that Hcmecwners Association holds legal title to the 
water right, lots and system; (2) remand for the court to issue a 
quiet title order in Homeowners Association's favor with no 
contingencies; (2) affirm the court's conclusion that Bagley is 
not entitled to any damages; (4) affirm the court's conclusion 
that Foothills Water Company's claim for slander of title be 
dismissed; (5) reverse zhe court's order denying summary judgment 
on the issue of compensation, actaiowledging the PSC's order that 
the amount of $15,224.99 is includable in the rate base; (6) 
reverse the district court's order regarding the validity of the 
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well lease agreement; and (7) reverse the court's order regarding 
distributees of water to outsiders, acknowledging the PSC's 
over that i^Fe-
WE CONCUR: 
7~ <. 
amela T. Greenwood,* Judge 
Gregory*". Orae, Judge 
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ADDENDUM 2 
IN THE SUPREME CODRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Association, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Bagley & Company, et al.# 
Defendant and Respondent, 
and, 
Foothills Water Company, 
Counterclaimant and 
Petitioner. 
No. 940046 
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The p e t i t i o n for writ of certiorari i s granted only as t o the 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Public Service Commission. 
For the Court 
n&fo D. Zimmerman 
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ADDENDUM 3 
This opinion is subject to revision be/ore final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
— - 0 0 O 0 0 — - • 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners No. 940046 
Association, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
F I L E D 
v . J u l y 20 , 1995 
Bagley & Company, a Utah 
corporation; J. Rodney Dansie; 
Gerald Bagley; Hi-Country 
Estates, Inc., a dissolved 
Utah corporation; Keith 
Spencer; Charles E. Lewton; 
and unknown persons claiming 
an interest in Hi-Country 
Estates Subdivision, 
Defendants. 
Foothills Water Company, a 
Utah corporation, 
Counterclaimant and 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Association, a Utah corporation; 
W. Norman Sims; and William P. 
Turner, 
Counterclaim Defendants 
and Respondents. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Attorneys: Larry R. Keller, Salt Lake City, for Hi-Country 
Estates Homeowners Association 
Ralph J. Marsh, Salt Lake City, for Bagley and 
Bagley & Company 
Val R* Antczak, Salt Lake City, for Dansie and 
Foothills Water Co. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
RUSSON. Justice: 
We granted certiorari for the narrow purpose of 
reviewing the court of appeals' decision concerning the 
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission (the PSC) as it 
relates to issues in this case. We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
Because the issues involved on certiorari relate solely 
to the PSC's jurisdiction, we recite only the facts that sure 
pertinent to that issue. A full discussion of the facts 
concerning other issues raised before the court of appeals in 
this matter can be found in Hi-Countrv Estates Homeowners Ass'n 
v. Baalev S Co.. 863 P.2d 1, 2-7 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert. 
granted. 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994). 
This case involves a controversy between Foothills 
Water Company (the Water Company) and the Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association (the Homeowners Association) concerning 
the ownership of a water system, two lots upon which the system7s 
water tanks are located, and a well water ricrht related to the 
water system. 
In March 1985, the Homeowners Association, which is 
comprised of the owners of lots in the Hi-Country Estates 
subdivision, brought this action in district court, seeking to 
quiet title to the subdivision7s water system, the two lots upon 
which the system's water tanks are located, and the related well 
water right, in the name of the Homeowners Association. The 
Water Company responded by filing a counterclaim, seeking to 
quiet title to the water system, the water lots, and the water 
right in its name.1 Gerald H. Bagley, a former owner and 
operator of the water system, also counterclaimed, arguing that 
if the court determined that the Homeowners Association owned the 
water system, it should be required to reimburse him for the cost 
of improvements he made to the water system, as well as for all 
expenses related to the operation and maintenance of the water 
system.2 
1
 The Water Company additionally sought damages for slander 
of title from the Homeowners Association and several individuals 
who are not parties to this appeal. However, this claim was 
dismissed by the district court for "lack of proof" and is not 
before this court on certiorari. 
2
 Although Bagley originally brought the counterclaim for 
reimbursement, the district court determined that the Water 
Company was the party properly entitled to reimbursement because 
Bagley had assigned all his rights to the Water Company. 
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While this matter was pending before the district 
court, a dispute arose between the Water Company and the 
Homeowners Association concerning increases in the rates charged 
by the Water Company. At a rate-setting hearing before the PSC 
in January 1986, the Homeowners Association argued that the Water 
Company should not be allowed to include the cost of the water 
system as a capital investment in its rate base. The PSC ruled 
that, pending resolution of the ownership dispute in district 
court, only a small portion of the Water Company's capital 
investment could be properly included in its rate base. On 
March 17, 1986, the PSC issued its final report and order, 
finding that only $16,334.99 of the improvements to the water 
system could be included in the rate base as legitimate costs 
thereof. 
Trial on the quiet title action began in district court 
on August 25, 1988. At that time, the parties agreed to 
stipulate to certain facts, proffer evidence on the remaining 
facts, brief all issues, and submit them to the court for 
decision. On October 14, 1988, the parties filed a stipulated 
statement of undisputed facts and -disputed contentions. 
Following a hearing on October 25, 1988, the district 
court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
judgment declaring that the Homeowners Association "is the legal 
owner of the disputed water system, which includes the water 
rights, the water lots, the water tanks, and the water lines." 
However, the court conditioned its ruling upon payment by the 
Homeowners Association to the Water Company of an amount to be 
determined at a later evidentiary hearing for improvements made 
to the water "system. 
The Homeowners Association subsequently moved for 
summary judgment on the issue of the amount of reimbursement it 
owed to the Water Company. The association asserted that the 
district court was bound by the PSC's determination that only 
$16,334.99 of the improvements to the water system could be 
included in the rate base. The court denied the motion. 
An evidentiary hearing was held in late July and early 
August 1990 to determine the amount of reimbursement owed by the 
Homeowners Association to the Water Company. Applying a theory 
of unjust enrichment, the district court determined that the 
Homeowners Association owed the Water Company $98,500 for the 
"entire water system, the improvements made thereon from 1974 to 
1985, and the water right." In an order dated October 31, 1990, 
the court directed the association to pay the sum of $98,500 to 
the Water Company no later than August 15, 1991. The court 
additionally ruled that a 1977 well lease agreement between 
Bagley, who owned and operated the water system at that time, and 
Jessie J. Dansie, the owner of the well in question, in which 
Dansie agreed to supply water from the Dansie well to the water 
system, was a valid and binding encumbrance on the water system 
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and required the association to permit the Dansies to receive and 
transport water through the subject water system free of charge 
as long as the system is operative. 
At a subsequent informal conference between the 
district judge and counsel for the parties, the Water Company and 
Bagley orally moved that the district court clarify its 
October 31, 1990, order to provide that if the Homeowners 
Association failed to pay the Water Company by August 15, 1991, 
the court would enter a judgment quieting title to the water 
system in the Water Company. The district court granted this 
motion and entered an order clarifying its prior order on 
February 5, 1991. 
On August 20, 1991, after being notified by the Water 
Company that the Homeowners Association had not paid the 
reimbursement sum of $98,500 as required by the court's 
February 5 order, the district court entered a judgment quieting 
title in the Water Company. 
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, the Homeowners 
Association asked the court to (1) reverse the district court's 
judgment quieting title in the Water Company and quiet title in 
its favor, (2) reverse the district court's denial of its motion 
for summary judgment on the issue of the amount it owed to the 
Water Company for improvements to the water system for the years 
1974 to 1985, and (3) reverse the district court's conclusion 
that it was required to reimburse the Water Company as a 
condition precedent to quieting title. 
The court of appeals (1) reversed the district court's 
judgment quieting title in the Water Company, holding that legal 
title was rightfully in the Homeowners Association; (2) reversed 
the district court's denial of summary judgment on the issue of 
the compensation owed to the Water Company, deferring to the 
PSC's determination that only $16,334.99 of the improvements to 
the water1 system were includable in the rate base, and 
(3) reversed the district court's judgment addressing the 
validity of the 1977 well lease agreement on the ground that the 
PSC had previously invalidated that agreement.3 
3
 In the same opinion, the court of appeals also reversed an 
interlocutory order of the district court which permitted the 
Water Company to transfer water through the system to customers 
within its service area but outside of the subdivision, provided 
that these customers pay a fair use fee. Hi-Countrv Estates 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Baalev i Co., 863 P.2d 1, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), cert, granted, 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994). However, 
subsequent to the issuance of that opinion, the Water Company has 
been decertified as a public utility by the PSC. Accordingly, 
its rights to transfer water are now moot. 
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The Water Company filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari with this court. We granted the said writ only for 
the narrow purpose of reviewing the court of appeals7 decision 
concerning the PSC's jurisdiction as it relates to the issues in 
this case* 
On certiorari, the Water Company raises the following 
two arguments in response to the court of appeals' opinion: 
First, it asserts that the PSC did not determine the fair market 
value of the property in question for all purposes, including 
unjust enrichment, nor did it have the power to do so; and 
second, it claims that the PSC did not invalidate the 1977 well 
lease agreement and did not have the power to do so- The 
Homeowners Association responds that (1) the PSC has the power to 
determine the fair market value of property for all purposes and 
therefore the court of appeals correctly ruled that the district 
court was bound by the PSC's determination that only $16,334.99 
of the improvements to the water system were includable in the 
rate base, and (2) the PSC has the power to invalidate the 1977 
well lease agreement and did invalidate that agreement. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In its motion for summary judgment on the issue of the 
amount of reimbursement owed to the Water Company, the Homeowners 
Association asserted that the district court could award the 
Water Company only $16,334.99," the amount that the PSC determined 
could be included in the rate base as legitimate costs of 
improvements to the system. Specifically, the association argued 
that the PSC had the power to determine the fair market value of 
the water system for all purposes and therefore the district 
court was bound by the PSC's determination. The district court 
denied the motion and, using a theory of unjust enrichment, 
determined that the association owed the Water Company $98,500 
for the nentire water system, the improvements made thereon from 
1974 to 1985, and the water right." The court of appeals 
reversed, holding that the PSC's rate base determination 
compelled the district court to limit its reimbursement award to 
$16,334.99. 
The PSC has only the rights and powers granted to it by 
statute. Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 
1988). Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 states in pertinent part: 
The commission is hereby vested with 
power and jurisdiction to supervise and 
regulate every public utility in this state, 
and to supervise all of the business of every 
such public utility in this state, and to do 
all things, whether herein specifically 
designated or in addition thereto, which are 
necessary or convenient in the exercise of 
such power and jurisdiction[.] 
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In keeping with this general grant of power, Utah Code 
Ann. S 54-4-21 specifically, provides: 
The commission shall have power to 
ascertain the value of the property of every 
public utility in this state and every fact 
which in its judgment may or does have any 
bearing on such value. The commission shall 
have power to make revaluations from time to 
time and to ascertain the value of new 
construction, extensions, and additions to 
the property of every public utility; 
provided, that the valuation of the property 
of all public utilities doing business within 
the state located in Utah as recorded in 
accordance with Section 54-4-22 of this 
chapter shall be considered the actual value 
of the properties of said public utilities in 
Utah unless otherwise changed after hearings 
by order of the commission. In case the 
commission changes the valuation of the 
properties of any public utility said new 
valuations found by the commission shall be 
the valuations of said public utility for all 
purposes provided in this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. 5 54-4-21 (emphasis added); see also Utah Code 
Ann. S 54-4-4 (granting PSC broad discretion in establishing 
rates for public utilities). 
"It is well established that the Commission has no 
inherent regulatory powers other than those expressly granted OJ 
clearly implied by statute." Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 928, 930 (Utah 1988) (citing Basin 
Flying Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 531 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah 
1975)). When a nyspecific power is conferred by statute upon a 
tribunal, board, or commission with limited powers, the powers 
are limited -to such as are specifically mentioned.'" Union Pac. 
R.R. v. Public Serv, Comm'n, 103 Utah 186, 197, 134 P.2d 469, 474 
(1943) (quoting Bamberger Elec. R.R. v. Public Utils- CoTmn'nr 59 
Utah 351, 364, 204 P. 314, 320 (1922)); accord Williams, 754 P.2d 
at 50. "All powers retained by the PSC are derived from and 
created by statute. The PSC has no inherent regulatory powers 
and can only assert those which are expressly granted or clearly 
implied as necessary to the discharge of the duties and 
responsibilities imposed upon it." Williams, 754 P.2d at 50 
(citing Basin Flying Serv.. 531 P.2d at 1305). Accordingly, 
w[t]o ensure that the administrative powers of the PSC are not 
overextended, *any reasonable doubt of the existence of any power 
must be resolved against the exercise thereof.'" Id. (quoting 
Public Serv. Comm'n v. Formal Complaint of WWZ Co.. 641 P.2d 183, 
186 (Wyo. 1982)). 
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Despite its broad language, section 54-4-1 does not 
confer upon the Commission a limitless right to act as it sees 
fit, and this court has never interpreted it as doing so. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 754 P.2d at 930. "Explicit or 
clearly implied statutory authority for any regulatory action 
must exist." Id. (citing Utah Deo't of Business Regulation v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986); Reams-
Tribune Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 682 P.2d 858, 859 (Utah 
1984)). Accordingly, the sections cited above clearly do not 
give the PSC absolute power to determine fair market value for 
all purposes, but merely for the purposes outlined in that 
chapter, that is, the purposes necessary to regulate and 
supervise public utilities. In fact, were we to hold otherwise 
and determine that the PSC can valuate property for all purposes, 
as the Homeowners Association would have us do, we would render 
the Utah Code internally inconsistent since the tax commission 
has the power to assess public utilities for the purposes of 
taxation. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-204. 
The district court's valuation of the property and 
water right in question did not involve the fair market value of 
the water system for rate-making purposes but, rather, involved 
the actual fair market value of the property for the purpose of 
determining the amount of unjust enrichment. Accordingly, the 
court of appeals erred in holding that the PSC has the authority 
to determine the fair market value of the property for all 
purposes and declaring deference to the PSC as to the value of 
the property in question for purposes of determining the amount 
of unjust enrichment. 
Moreover, even if the PSC had the power and authority 
to determine fair market value of the water system for all 
purposes, it did not do so in the present case. It is clear from 
the PSC's March 17, 1986, order that it was determining the value 
of the water system only for the purposes of rate-making. In 
fact, the first sentence of that order states, "Pursuant to 
notice duly served, this matter came on for general rate hearing 
on January 22, 23, 24, [27,] and 28, 1986, before Kent Walgren, 
Administrative Law Judge for the Utah Public Service Commission.n 
(Emphasis added.) Furthermore, the PSC did not find that 
$16,334.99 was the fair market value of the improvements to the 
system, but simply found that that figure represented fl[the Water 
Company's] total allowable rate base." Finally, the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law supporting the PSC's order 
exclusively address the PSC's determination of the fair rate that 
the Water Company may charge its customers. Since (1) any order 
of the PSC must be narrowly construed as passing only upon the 
issues before it, White River Shale Oil Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Commln, 700 P.2d 1088, 1093 (Utah 1985), and (2) the PSC's 
March 17, 1986, order addressed the value of the water system 
solely for rate-making purposes, it was error for the court of 
appeals to order the district court to defer to this figure for 
purposes of unjust enrichment. Accordingly, the court of appeals 
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erred in reversing the district courts denial of the Homeowners 
Association's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the 
amount of reimbursement owed to the Water Company and in ordering 
the district court to defer to the PSC. 
WELL LEASE AGREEMENT 
In 1977, Bagley, the owner and operator of the subject 
water system at that time, and Dansie, the owner of the well in 
question, entered into a well lease agreement under the terms of 
which water from the Dansie well was supplied to the Hi-Country 
Estates subdivision water system. The lease stated that it had a 
ten-year term but could be renewed on April 10, 1987, "on terms 
to be agreed to by Bagley and Dansie." Subsequently, in 1980, 
Bagley transferred his interest in the water system to Jordan 
Acres, a limited partnership of which Bagley was a general 
partner. On June 7, 1985, this interest was transferred from 
Jordan Acres to the Water Company. In its March 17, 1986, order, 
the PSC found that the well lease agreement was "grossly 
unreasonable" and refused to impose its terms upon the Homeowners 
Association. The district court, on the other hand, ruled that 
the 1977 well lease agreement was a valid and binding encumbrance 
on the subdivision's water system. On appeal to the court of 
appeals, the Homeowners Association argued that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity of an 
encumbrance on a public utility and that the PSC's determination 
precluded the Water Company from asserting the validity of the 
well lease agreement. The court of appeals agreed and reversed 
the district court's order. 
On certiorari, the Water Company argues alternatively 
that (1) the PSC's March 17, 1986, order did not invalidate the 
1977 agreement, and (2) even if the PSC's order did purport to 
invalidate that agreement, the PSC did not have jurisdiction to 
do so. The Homeowners Association responds that the PSC's order 
did invalidate the 1977 agreement between Dansie and Bagley and 
therefore the court of appeals was correct in reversing the 
district court's order directing the association to provide the 
Dansies water as long as the system is operative. 
The PSC's March 17, 1986, order specifically found: 
11. On April 7, 1977, Jesse Dansie, as 
lessor, and Bagley as lessee, entered into a 
"Well Lease and Water Line Extension 
Agreement" (hereafter "Well Lease Agreement") 
for Well No. 1 . . . . Under this ten-year 
lease (which expires in April 1987), in 
return for the use of the well and water 
therefrom, Bagley agrees to the following: 
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a. To pay $5,100 plus $300 per 
month for the first five years and $600 
per month for the next five years. 
12. In 1980, the Subdivision water 
company was transferred from Bagley to 
another limited partnership, Jordan Acres 
("Jordan Acres"), of which Bagley was a 
general partner. On June 7, 1985, • • • the 
water company assets were transferred from 
Jordan Acres to [the Water Company], in 
return for all of [the Water Company's] 
outstanding shares. 
On the basis of these and other findings, the PSC 
concluded: 
The Commission finds that it is unreasonable 
to expect [the Water Company] to support the 
entire burden of the Well Lease Agreement. 
This Agreement, insofar as it relates 
strictly to benefits received by [the Water 
Company] . . . is grossly unreasonable, 
requiring not only substantial monthly 
payments, but also showering virtually 
limitless benefits on Jessie Dansie and the 
members of his immediate family. . • • 
. . . While no one can blame Mr. Dansie 
for desiring to provide free water to his 
children in virtual perpetuity, this 
Commission would be abrogating its statutory 
duty were it to impose such a burden on [the 
Water Company's] present and future 
customers• 
. . . We find that it would be unjust 
and unreasonable to expect [the Water 
Company's] 63 active customers [i.e., the 
Homeowners Association] to support the entire 
burden of the Well Lease Agreement. . . . 
. . . The Commission has no objection to 
the Dansies continuing to obtain their water 
from Well No. 1, provided the actual pro-rata 
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(not incremental) costs for power, 
chlorination and water testing involved in 
delivering that water are paid for by someone 
other than customers in [the Water Company's] 
service area [i.e., the members of the 
Homeowners Association]. 
Under the plain language of the PSC's order, the effect 
of that order was to prohibit the 1977 well lease agreement from 
affecting the rates paid by the Homeowners Association, not to 
invalidate the agreement altogether. In other words, the PSC's 
order did not purport to invalidate the 1977 agreement, it merely 
limited the amount that the Homeowners Association would pay for 
it, a matter clearly within the PSC's rate-making authority. 
Thus, the court of appeals incorrectly held that the PSC's order 
invalidated the 1977 well lease agreement. 
In any event, the PSC did not have jurisdiction to 
invalidate the 1977 well lease agreement as long as that 
agreement did not impact the rates paid by the Homeowners 
Association. Although the PSC has power to construe contracts 
affecting matters within its jurisdiction such as rate-making, 
ordinary contracts unrelated to such matters are outside of the 
purview of PSC jurisdiction. See Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 682 P.2d 858, 860 (Utah 1984) (f,Any activities of a 
utility that actually affect its rate structure would necessarily 
be subject to some degree to the PSC's broad supervisory powers 
in relation to rates. The question, then, is whether the 
activity the Commission is attempting to regulate is closely 
connected to its supervision of the utility's rates and whether 
the manner of the regulation is reasonably related to the 
legitimate legislative purpose of rate control for the protection 
of the consumer.M); see also Garkane Power Ass'n v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n. 681 P.2d 1196, 1207 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) (holding 
that not every contract entered into by a public utility is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the PSC; contracts such as those 
concerning the ordinary conduct of a business can be litigated 
only in district court and not before the PSC). See generally 
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988) 
(stating that ,f%any reasonable doubt of the existence of any 
power [of the PSC] must be resolved against the exercise 
thereof" (quoting Public Serv. Comm'n v. Formal Complaint of WWZ 
Co.. 641 P-2d 183, 186 (Wyo. 1982))). 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, the court of appeals' 
reversal of the district court's denial of the Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association's motion for summary judgment on the issue 
of the amount of reimbursement owed to Foothills Water Company is 
reversed. The court of appeals' determination that the PSC's 
order invalidated the 1977 well lease agreement between Bagley 
and Dansie is also reversed, and this matter is remanded to the 
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court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
Michael 0. Zimmerman, Chief 
Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate 
Chief Justice 
Richard C- Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
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ADDENDUM 5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE HOMEOWNERS 
SHOULD PAY FOOTHILLS S98,500.00 TO OBTAIN A QUIET TITLE 
ORDER TO THE WATER SYSTEM AND WATER RIGHT, 
The trial judge issued its "Order on Ownership Issues" on 
October 20, 1989, and ruled that H(P)laintiff is the legal owner of 
the disputed water system, which includes the water rights, the 
water lots, the water tanks, and the water lines." (Add. 1). The 
Court went on in paragraph 2 to order an evidentiary hearing ". . 
. to establish the amount of reimbursement due to Defendants Bagley 
SL Company and/or Foothills Water Company for the reasonable value 
of improvements made by Defendant Bagley & Company." (R. 896). 
Finally, in paragraph 3, the Court stated "(A)n Order Quieting 
Title to the water system, in the name of Plaintiff, will issue 
upon payment in full by Plaintiff to Defendant of the Court's 
Reimbursement Order fqr Improvements by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff's water system for the years 1974 to 1985." (Emphasis 
supplied) (R. 896). 
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A. The Homeowners should not have been required to pay 
for the water right. 
Although ruling initially in its "Order on Ownership Issues" 
that the Homeowners would be given a Quiet Title Order to the water 
system upon reimbursement to Appellees Bagley & Company and/or 
Foothills Water Company for the reasonable value of improvements 
made by Appellee Bagley & Company, the Court caused great confusion 
by expanding its inquiry at the time of the valuation portion of 
the trial (July 30, 31, and August 1, 1990). The Court allowed and 
required the parties to present evidence regarding the value of the 
water right in question, Application No. 33130 (59-1608) also 
referred to as the "Glazier Well Water Right". 
After the parties had submitted the ownership portion of the 
trial to the Court by stipulation (R* 452), the Court entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated October 20, 1989 (R. 
899-904). Finding of Fact No. 4 as it related to the water right 
in this case reads as follows: 
"4. Plaintiff, Hi-Country Estate Homeowners 
Association, obtained legal right, title and 
interest in the disputed water system from the 
following sources: 
(f) An Assignment from Hi-Country Estates, 
Inc., to Plaintiff, of the disputed water 
rights. 
(g) An acknowledgment by the State Engi-
neer's Division of Water Rights that the 
Plaintiff is owner of the water rights, more 
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specifically, water right referred to in this 
action as the Glazier Well Water Right." 
Add- 4 p. 4 (R. 901, 902). 
Despite this clear finding by the Court that the Appellant was 
the legal owner of this disputed water right and a recitation of 
the chain of ownership, the Court expanded its inquiry at the 
valuation portion of the trial to include the value of the water 
right. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law after the 
valuation portion of the trial, the Court found as a matter of 
fact: 
"9. The Homeowners Association will be un-
justly enriched unless they reimburse Foot-
hills Water Company, as successor-in-interest 
to Bagley & Company, for the fair amount of 
the entire water system, the improvements made 
thereon from 1974 to 1985 and the water right. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Add. 5 p. 4; R. 1623. 
Furthermore, in its Conclusions of Law, the Court stated: 
"2. The Homeowners Association must pay 
Foothills Water Company the total sum of 
$98,500.00 for the value of the water system 
and water right." (Emphasis supplied). 
Add. 5 p. 5; R. 1624. 
Finally, in the Court's "Order Regarding Amount Payable by 
Plaintiff for Subject Water System11, the Court ruled: 
"The Plaintiff is entitled to an Order Quiet-
ing Title to the water system within the 
boundaries of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision 
Phase I, and the water right represented by 
Application No.» 33130 (59-1608) on file with 
Utah State Department of Natural Resources, 
Division of Water Rights and the Utah State 
Engineer's Office, upon payment of the sum of 
598,500.00 to Foothills Water Company. Such 
amount shall be payable in full no later 
August 15, 1991. The unpaid balance is inter-
est free." (Emphasis supplied). 
Add. 6 p. 2; R. 1627. 
It seems incredible to the Homeowners that they should be 
found to have owned the water right and yet be required to pay 
Foothills in order to obtain a Quiet Title Order to said water 
right. 
Appellant clearly established title to the water right in 
question by presenting documents showing the chain at trial. 
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 15 (Add. 7; R. 1359, 1400) is a certified 
copy of a document on file with the Department of Natural Resourc-
es, Division of Water Rights, showing a transfer of the water right 
in question from Joseph Butterfield to Hi-County Estates, Inc., in 
May of 1971. Hi-Country Estates, Inc., was stipulated by the 
parties to be the general partner of the limited partnership known 
as Hi-Country Estates Second in the development of Hi-Country 
Estates Subdivision Phase I (R. 569). 
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 16 (Add. 8; R. 1359, 1402) is an 
Assignment of Application for the same water right showing a 
transfer by Charles E. Lewton, one of the original developers of 
the subdivision and principal of Hi-Country Estates, Inc., to the 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association dated June 28, 1985. 
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 17 (Add. 9; R. 1359, 1404) is a letter 
from Marge Tempest in the title section of the State Department of 
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Natural Resources, Division of Water Rights, indicating that the 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association does in fact own the 
water right in question according to their office's records. 
Although a subsequent Assignment of Application of the same 
water right was apparently prepared by Appellee Gerald H. Bagley 
allegedly on behalf of Hi-Country Estates, Inc., assigning the 
water right in question to Foothills Water Company, said document 
was not signed until February 25, 1987, almost two years after Hi-
Country Estates, Inc., had made the Assignment in question to the 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association (Add. 10; R. 1359, 1406). 
Said document was admitted at trial as Plaintiff's Exhibit 21 with 
a letter from the same Marge Tempest of the State Department of 
Natural Resources, Division of Water Rights, rejecting Foothills1 
effort to file this Assignment of Application with their department 
due to the fact that a previous Assignment had been made by Hi-
Country Estates, Inc. to Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association 
of the same water right (Add. 11; R. 1359, 1407). 
Therefore, by awarding Foothills some portion of the 
$98,500.00 as value for the water right, the Court made a very 
unfair and unjust decision. It awarded Appellees value for 
something they did not own according to the official public records 
of ownership in the Utah State Engineer's Office, and the Assign-
ment of Application by Hi-Country Estates, Inc. in 1985 to the 
Homeowners. 
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Furthermore, this water right was paid for by the Homeowners 
through their purchase of lots, since the original developers have 
admitted they recovered the value of the water system through the 
sale of the lots. Plaintiff's Exhibit 20, Add. 12; R. 1359, 1650 
pp. 29, 30; R. 1409-1411. Although Appellee Gerald H. Bagley 
testified differently at trial, his deposition was taken prior to 
trial on April 12, 1988. The following exchange took place: 
WQ. But it was your understanding that ulti-
mately the money that was recovered, you would 
recover your investment in the water system by 
selling lots; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You've been involved in other real estate 
development; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that consistent with what we've just 
discussed with the way you funded the cost of 
what I'll call common improvements, water 
systems, roads, etc., in those other projects? 
A. I would say it is consistent, yes, except 
we did it differently on the Jeremy Ranch, but 
in that case the people had to go separately, 
buy a share of water. 
Q. Was that a mutual stock? 
A. It's a mutual stock company. 
R. 1650 pp. 29, 30. 
Mr. Bagley admitted his memory was better during his deposi-
tion on April 12, 1988, than it was during trial on July 31, 1990, 
when he said he did not intend to recover the cost of the water 
system in the sale of lots (R. 2242). In addition, Mr. Bagley was 
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one of only three developers of the subdivision, and he indicated 
at trial that he didn't know if the other two developers, Lewton 
and Spencer, had built in the cost of the water system in lot sales 
during the period of time he had sold out to them and they had 
established the costs to be recovered in the sale of lots (R. 2244, 
2245). 
Therefore, it seems incomprehensible that the Court required 
the purchasers of the lots (who are shareholding members of the 
Appellant) to pay any value a second time for the water right, and 
indeed the component parts of the water system in general. (See 
infra subpoint B). Appellant respectfully requests that the Courtf s 
Order requiring whatever portion of the $98,500*00 was allocated by 
the trial judge to the water right (and this is unknown from the 
Court's Orders), be reversed. 
B. The Homeowners have already paid for the water 
system and should not be required to pay a second 
time. 
It is the Homeowners' position that the original developers 
recovered the value of the water system through the sale of lots in 
Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I. The testimony by deposi-
tion of Mr. Gerald H. Bagley on April 12, 1988, cited supra 
thoroughly supports this position. The testimony in that deposi-
tion was elicited by attorney T. Patrick Casey representing 
Appellees Foothills Water Company and J. Rodney Dansie. 
Mr. Bagley's opposite testimony at trial is a clear example of 
how unbelievable and incredible Appellees' witnesses were in this 
18 
matter. Appellant submits that this clear reversal of testimony by 
Mr. Bagley shows the lengths to which Appellees went to have the 
Court place a high value on this water system, when they have 
already been compensated for the system through the sale of the 
lots. 
Of course, Mr. Bagley had a very specific interest in seeing 
that this Court awarded a high value with regard to the water 
system. He testified he satisfied debts and obligations to J. 
Rodney Dansie by ostensibly transferring this water system to him 
in October of 1985 (during the pendency of this lawsuit), and would 
stand to be liable to Mr. Dansie for some $80,000.00 to $148,000.00 
(depending upon which Appellee is believed) if this Court had 
issued a Quiet Title Order to the Homeowners (R. 2251, 2252). 
John Thomas, a real estate agent who had resided in Hi-Country 
Estates Subdivision Phase I for 19 years at time of trial, 
testified he was originally employed by Mr. Spencer and Mr. Lewton 
as project manager for the development in approximately 1971 (R. 
2087, 2088). Mr. Thomas testified he sold approximately 90 of the 
121 lots available in Phase I of the subdivision himself (R. 2088). 
Mr. Thomas further testified that he was the manager of the water 
system employed by the original developers (R. 2088, 2089). Mr. 
Thomas testified that he had been authorized by Mr. Spencer and Mr. 
Lewton, (who had bought out Mr. Bagley at the time and were 
responsible for the development of the subdivision through Hi-
Country Estates Second, and its general partner, Hi-Country 
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Estates, Inc.), to inform potential lot purchasers " . . . that the 
property owners association was to own the water system, at the 
time that the developers turned the property back or over to them, 
activated the property owners association. . ." (R. 2090). Mr. 
Thomas further testified that the lots would have been worthless to 
a prospective purchaser without the water system (R. 2091). 
William Turner was called by Appellant and testified that he 
was a member of the Homeowners Association and had first bought his 
lot in 1972 from Mr. Thomas. He testified that he understood when 
he purchased the lot that the water system " • . . belonged to the 
Association. • ." and that the value of the water system was 
recovered by the original developer in the price of the lot that he 
paid (R. 2101, 2102). 
Mr. W. Norman Sims was called to testify at the trial. He 
stated that he was president of Appellant Homeowners Association 
and a member of the Board of Directors. He testified he purchased 
two lots in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I in 1980 (R. 
2105). He further testified that it was his opinion that the lot 
owners had paid for the water system when they bought their lots, 
and that "the expenditure for a water system was paid for once. 
Everyone else buying that understood and it was represented that 
the water system is theirs." (R. 2135, 2136). More specifically, 
Mr. Sims testified: 
"We paid for the (water) system when we bought 
our property, and this would go with the land, 
and once it is paid for, every time that this 
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land would change hands, when I bought my 
property, it had been sold once previously, on 
both lots that I had, one which I still main-
tain, (sic) It was my understanding that the 
water system had been paid for, and was in 
place, and the only additional cost of that 
type would be whatever that hook-up cost would 
be to tie into that system itself." 
R. 2143. 
Other than the trial testimony of Mr. Bagley, which was 
impeached by his April 12, 1988, deposition testimony as aforemen-
tioned, counsel does not recall that any additional evidence 
whatsoever was presented by Appellees to contradict the clear 
evidence presented that the value of the water system had been 
built into the price of the lots when originally sold by the 
developers. In fact, in the deposition of Charles Lewton, one of 
the original developers and a principal in Hi-Country Estates, 
Inc., Mr. Lewton testified that the reason the Homeowners Associa-
tion was created by the developers originally was so that they 
could take over the "amenities" that would service all of the lot 
owners. When asked what the types of amenities were he was 
referring to, Mr. Lewton responded: 
"Well, I know the roads and the gate and the 
water system. And I don't know how it was 
left when we left here. I personally don't 
know. I do know that since day one, we'd 
intended for Salt Lake City Conservancy, and I 
know that they were to come in, and what that 
means, I don't know at this point. I know 
they were to take the system over." 
R. 1655 p. 39. 
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This testimony by one of the original developers seems to be 
a clear impeachment of the trial testimony of Mr. Bagley. See R. 
2239, 2240. 
The conclusion that must be drawn from this is that the Court 
originally made the right decision in finding that Appellant 
Homeowners were "the legal owners of the disputed water system, 
which includes the water rights, the water lots, the water tanks, 
and the water lines" (Add. 1). However, when the Court made the 
further determination that the Homeowners would not be given an 
order quieting title to the water system and the water right until 
such time as they had paid $98,500.00 to Foothills Water Company, 
the Court was clearly requiring the Homeowners to pay twice for 
this water system (R. 1627). The order of the Court should be 
reversed and the case remanded with instructions to the lower court 
to issue a Quiet Title Order without the requirement of a payment 
of additional monies by the Homeowners. 
C, The water system in this case has little value to 
anyone but Appellant, but at any rate is worth no 
more than $27,650.00. 
Appellant introduced at trial the testimony of Jon Strawn, 
former Chief Rate Engineer for the Division of Public Utilities, 
who testified Foothills Water Company has reported a substantial 
loss every year between 1985 and the present to the Public Service 
Conunission (R. 1995, 1996). Further, Appellant admitted stipulated 
Exhibit CCC as Plaintiff's Exhibit 13 in the trial, which was a 
document summarizing the net operating losses incurred by Foothills 
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Water Company (submitted by Appellee originally to the Court), as 
showing a total net loss between 1985 and September 1, 1988, of 
$250,004.00 for that period of time (Add. 13; R. 1359, 1454). In 
addition, stipulated Exhibit AAA admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 
shows the losses incurred by Bagley & Company between 1975 and 1984 
to have been $271,717.00 (Add. 14; R. 1359, 1456). 
Mr. Strawn went on to testify at trial as follows: 
"Q. . . . Does the system have any value on 
the open market to anyone, in light of the 
fact that its expenses far exceed its reve-
nues? 
A. Not in my opinion. As I said before, it 
would have a negative net present value. 
Therefore, anybody that would invest in that, 
if it was a private investor, would be regu-
lated by the public utility — by the Public 
Service Commission. There would be a non-
allowance of rate base. Therefore, there 
would be no rate of return on any rate base. 
Therefore, in my opinion, it would have nega-
tive net present value, and not be worth 
anything on the market, because its expenses 
exceed its revenues, and that gives you a 
negative net present value. 
Q. So the Court will understand this, what 
you are saying is if anyone purchased this 
water system on the open market, they would 
never be able to recover the cost of their 
purchase price from the Public Service Commis-
sion; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. They could not build that into rate base, 
and the purchase price would simply be lost; 
is that correct? 
A. That's correct. Plus, in my opinion, 
Foothills Water Company has reached its price 
inelasticity, which means when the rates were 
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set on 60 customers and now we only have 48, 
basically the — you are losing revenues. 
They are in what we call a death spiral, a 
downward spiral. No matter what prices you 
raise the rates to, people would simply leave 
the system. It has been shown through various 
complaints to me that people can go out and 
drill their own well out there, and take a 
loan from the bank, and pay that back at 
cheaper rates than what they can purchase 
water from Foothills Water Company. That is 
what has caused people to jump to basically 
get off the system and drill their own wells. H 
(Emphasis supplied). 
R. 1998, 1999. 
Apparently, the Court in this case completely disregarded Mr. 
Strawn9s opinion; yet as Chief Rate Engineer for the Division of 
Public Utilities, his opinions should have been carefully consid-
ered by the Court. 
Appellant called Mr. John Probasco, the civil engineer from 
Busch & Gudgell,. Inc., who originally designed and installed the 
first phase of the water system in Hi-Country Estates Subdivision, 
who testified "the system has little value if any, to anybody but 
the homeowners in Hi-Country" (R. 2047, 2055, 2057). He testified 
his opinion of the value of the improvements between 1974 and the 
present is $13,376.69 (R. 2052); but that it would cost a new owner 
$160,300.00 to bring this antiquated water system up to appropriate 
standards (R. 2053, 2055). 
Appellant called Mr. Richard Ellis, assistant treasurer for 
the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, who has been 
involved in negotiations with Foothills to purchase the water 
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system. He testified that in his opinion the whole system, tanks, 
lines, lots and all is worth a maximum of $27,650.00 (R. 2080). 
His valuation was accepted by the Board of Directors of the 
District (Add. 16; Trial Exhibit 10; R. 1359). 
Foothills called two witnesses to establish value. Stanley S. 
Postma placed the value of the system (combining three different 
valuation methods) at between $409,000.00 and $482,000.00 (R. 2173) 
and he valued the water right at between $149,000.00 and 
$182,000.00 (R. 2171). 
Seth Schick, hired a week prior to trial by Foothills, is an 
engineer who testified he thought the value of the water system was 
$110,000.00 to $115,000.00 more than Postma's value (therefore 
between $524,000.00 and $607,000.00) (R. 2288). Mr. Schick valued 
the water right at $359,000.00 (R. 2275). 
These bloated values of the system and water right (disagreed 
upon by Foothills' own witnesses) had to clearly have been rejected 
by the trial judge when he reached the combined value of the water 
right and water system at $98,500.00. 
Appellant submits that the judge, while merely plucking a 
figure out of the air, was not about to be persuaded by the 
outrageous estimates of Foothills' experts for a water system that 
has never shown a net profit. (See Point II, subpoint C supra). 
Appellant believes the judge's conclusion was clearly 
erroneous and should be reversed. 
25 
ADDENDUM 6 
WELL LEASE AND WATER LINE EXTENSION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this /^~-day of April, 
1977, by and between JESSE H. DANSIE, hereinafter referred to as 
•Dansie", and GERALD H. BAGLEY, hereinafter referred to as "Bagley", 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, Dansie is the owner of property located in Sections 
33, 34 and 35, Township 3 South, Ranqe 2 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and is also the owner of water rights evidenced by 
Certificate No. 8212 Application No. 26451, and the rights to 
water therefrom and a water distribution system located on such 
property; and 
WHEREAS, Bagley is the owner of property located in Section 
33, Township 3 South, Range 2 West, and Sections 1, 2, 4, 5, and 
11, Township 4 South, Range 2 West Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and is also the owner of a water distribution system located on 
part of the property owned by him; and 
WHEREAS, Dansie and Bagley desire to connect their water 
systems and make use of the Dansie well and water for their 
mutual benefit, upon the terms and conditions provided herein: 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants 
hereinafter provided, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
A. WELL LEASE 
1. Dansie hereby leases to Bagley the well located South 
758 Feet and East 1350 Feet from the West quarter corner of 
Section 33, Township 3 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, identified by Certificate No. 26451 issued by the Utah 
State Engineer's Office, hereinafter referred to as "Dansie Well 
No. 1", including the equipment for operation of such well and the 
rights to all of the water therefrom, for a period of ten (10) 
years from the date of this Agreement. 
2. Bag ley shall pay to Dansie Five Thousand One Hundred 
Dollars ($5,100.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, 
and as rental for such lease, Bagley shall pay to Dansie $300.00 
each month during the first five years of this lease commencing 
April 10, 1977, provided the monthly rental shall be increased to 
$600.00 per month at such time as thirty (30) additional hook-ups 
are installed on the Hi-Country Water Company Distribution System 
operated by Bagley* As of the date of this Agreement, there are 
28 hook-ups, such hook-ups being detailed in Exhibit II. 
3. Commencing April 10, 1982, the monthly rental payments 
shall be increased to $600.00 per month unless they have already 
been increased to that amount pursuant to Paragraph 2 above. 
4. Bagley shall have the right to renew this Well Lease on 
terms to be agreed to by Bagley and Dansie at the termination of 
this Lease on April 10, 1987. 
S\ Bagley agrees to provide and install a seal around the 
well pipe of Dansie Well No. 1 as required to meet the Utah State 
Division of Health standards and to install a new pump on the 
well within the first five (5) years of this lease and shall be 
responsible for all maintenance of Dansie Well No. 1 during the 
term of this lease. 
6. Bagley agrees to pay all pumping costs, repairs, and 
maintenance of said well for the period of this Agreement. Bagley 
agrees to maintain the said well, and electric motor in good 
operating condition. Any changes or modifications to said well, 
motor and pumping equipment shall be paid for by Bagley and will 
become the property of Dansie at the termination of this Agreement. 
7. The existing pump, electric motor and transformers will 
remain the property of Dansie and will be delivered to Dansie if 
removed from said well. Any new equipment to be installed in 
said well such as an electric motor, pumps and transformers and 
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piping shall become the property of Dansie and shall be free and 
clear of any mortgages, liens or encumbrances at the termination 
of this Agreement. 
8. Bagley agrees for himself, his successors, and assigns 
to be responsible for and to indemnify Dansie, his successors 
and assigns, against any and all liability, losses and damages, 
of any nature whatever, and charges and expenses, including court 
costs and attorneys' fees that Dansie may sustain or be put to 
and which arise out of the operations, rights and obligations of 
Bagley pursuant to this Agreement whether such liability, loss, 
damage charges or expenses are the result of the actions or 
ommissions of Bagley, his employees, agents or otherwise. 
9. Dansie does not warrant that the water from Dansie Well No. 
does now or at any time during the term of this Agreement, and any 
extension thereof, will meet any standards for culinary water as 
required by the Utah State Division of Health. However, a letter 
of approval of the water by the Utah State Board of Health is 
attached (Exhibit 12) and the requirements are set forth in said 
letter. 
B. EXTENSION WO. 1 
1. Within one year from the date hereof, Dansie shall with 
his equipment perform all labor required to excavate for and 
install a 5-inch £«<V«C. Class 200 pipeline connecting the Dansie 
Well No. 1 to the existing Hi-Country Water Company water system 
owned by Bagley at a point in Lot 19 as referenced by the map in 
Exhibit II. Bagley shall purchase and furnish all permits, pipe, 
materials and supplies required for this connection and shall 
obtain an easement across Lot 19 at his expense. 
2. Dansie shall own the line upon completion of the work 
and Bagley shall be able to use said line during the term of this 
Agreement. Bagley shall have a right to enter the property 
upon which the pipeline and connection is located for the purpose 
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of installing, maintaining and using the water line to be installed 
thereon pursuant to Paragraph B (1) above. Bagley hereby grants 
and conveys to Dansie an easement and right-of-way over and 
across property in the Hi-Country Estate Subdivision for the same 
purpose. Dansie shall have a right to take water from the line at 
points that may serve the property along the line of Extension 
No. 1. Dansie shall own and Bagley will be responsible for 
maintenance of the extension during the life of this Agreement. 
C. EXTENSION NO. 2 
1. Within one year from the date hereof, Dansie shall, with 
his equipment and at his expense, perform all labor raquirad to 
excavate for and install a 6-inch P.V.C. Class 200 pipeline 
connecting the Hi-Country Estates Water Company water system, 
from its moat Easterly point at approximataly 7350 West and 13300 
South in Salt Lake County, to the Dansie water line at approximataly 
7200 Wast and 13300 South, including a pressure-reducing valve at 
tha point of connection with the Hi-Country Estates Watar Company 
system at 7350 West 13300 South. Dansie shall purchase and 
furnish all pipe, materials and supplies required for this connection. 
2. Dansie shall obtain and provide all easements and permits 
and pay all fees required for this connection and extension, except 
as for aueh line that may be on property of Ui-Country Homeowners 
Association or Bagley. 
3. Dansie shall own and be responsible for all maintenance 
of this Extension No. 2. 
4. Bagley shall have the right, at all times during the 
term of this Agreement or any extension thereof, to run water from 
the Hi-Country Eatates Watar Company system through the Danaia 
watar system and Extension No. 1 and No. 2 and No. 3 to property 
owned by Bagley in Sections 1, 2, and 11, Township 4 South, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
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D. EXTENSION NO, 3 
1. Within one year from the date hereof, Dansie shall, with 
his equipment perform all labor required to excavate for and 
install a 6-inch P.V.C. Class 200 pipeline connecting to the 
Dansie water system at 6800 West and 13000 South in Salt Lake 
County and extending along 6800 West to 13400 South. Bagley shall 
purchase and furnish all permits, pipe, materials and supplies 
required for this connection and extension. 
2. Dansie shall own and Bagley shall be responsible for all 
maintenance of this Extension No. 3 during the life of this Agreement. 
E. OTHER WELLS AND HOOK-UPS 
1. Dansie shall have the right, at his expense, to connect 
any additional wells owned by him, located in Section 33, 34 and 35, 
Township 3 South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian identified 
by Certificate No. _ _ _ _ issued by the Utah State Engineers 
Office, hereinafter referred to as "Dansie Wells" and by change 
application No. 9-8635 (59-3879) issued by the Utah State Engineers 
Offiee, hereinafter referred to as "Dansie Well No. 3," to the 
water system owned by Dansie, including Extension No. 2, and to 
commingle the water from these wells with that in the system from 
other sources so long as the water from such wells at all times 
*eet all standards for culinary water required by the Utah State 
Division of Health. 
2. Dansie shall have the right to receive up to five (5) 
residential hook-ups onto the water system on the Dansie property 
for members of his immediate family without any payment of hook-up 
fees and shall further have the right to receive reasonable amounts 
of water from the system through these five (5) hook-ups for 
culinalry and yard irrigation at no cost. 
3. Dansie shall further have the right to receive up to fifty 
(50) residential hook-ups onto the water system orv the Dansie 
property for which no hook-up fees will be charged. Water service 
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charges shall be charged to the recipients thereof of which 
Dansie shall receive fifty percent (501) of the water service 
billings paid by those recipients in consideration for Dansie1s 
maintenance of his part of the water system. 
4. Dansie shall receive not less than $4,000.00 or One 
Hundred percent (100%) of all of the hook-up fees to the water 
system on the Leon property located between the Hi-Country Estates 
property in Sections 33, Township 3 South, Range 2 West, and the 
Dansie property in Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 2 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian and shall receive fifty percent (501) 
of the revenues from water service charges to such property. 
5. Dansie shall have the right to use for any purposes and 
at no cost, any excess water from the Hi-Country Estates Water 
Company system Well No. 1, not required or being used by Bagley 
or customers of the Hi-Country Estates Water Company. Any power 
or other costs of pumping such excess water shall be paid by 
Dansie. 
F. MWCEiajoreogs 
1. It is understood that Bagley intends to use the entire 
water system formed by the extensions and connections provided for 
herein, including the present systems owned by Bagley and Dansie, 
for the purpose of providing water to users in the area covered 
by this system or which can be reached by extensions and connections 
to this system, that Bagley intends to charge hook-up and water 
service fees to water users, that Bagley is entitled to all such 
fees and other charges except as otherwise provided in this 
Agreement, and that Bagley is responsible for all costs of other 
extensions and connections except as otherwise provided in this 
Agreement. 
2. Dansie agrees that Bagley may form a.water company, using 
such entity or form of organization as Bagley desires, and may 
convey all his rights to the water system referred to in this 
Agreement and assign his interest in this Agreement to any such 
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entity or organization. Bagley will be personally responsible 
for lease terms and conditions if assignee fails to meet the 
terms and conditions of the lease. No assignment, conveyance or 
sublease shall release Bagley from liabilities and obligation 
under this Agreement. 
3. Oansie further agrees that Bagley may apply to the Utah 
Public Service Commission for such permits or approvals as may be 
required and Dansie shall cooperate fully in all respects as may 
be required to obtain such permits or approvals as may be required 
by the Public Service Commission.
 m Bagley agrees to pay all costs 
incurred in obtaining such approval, including but not limited to, 
legal and engineering fees. 
4. Bagley and Dansie each agree to execute and deliver any 
additional documents and/or easements which may be necessary to 
carry out the provisions and intent of this Agreement. 
5. Non-payment of any monthly installment will, at the 
option of Dansie, automatically terminate this Agreement. All 
remaining lease payments, in the event of termination for non-
payment of any monthly installment, shall become immediately due 
and payable to Dansie. If it becomes necessary for Dansie to sue 
for the liquidated damages (remaining lease payments), Bagley 
shall pay attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Dansie. 
6. Dansie shall have first right of refusal to purchase 
the entire Hi-Country water system if it is to be sold or assigned 
to a third party. 
7. Bagley, and his assigns or successors, agree to supply 
water to the Dansie property as provided for in this Agreement and 
for such time beyond the expiration or termination of this Agreement 
as water is supplied to any of the Hi-Country properties or that the 
lines and water system referred to in this Agreement are in existence 
and water is being supplied from another source such as Salt Lake 
County Conservancy District. Such water as is provided subsequent 
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to the expiration or termination of this Agreement shall be made 
available upon the same terms, conditions and rates as are set 
forth in this Agreement. 
DATED this 7 - day of April, 1377. 
UhKAU) U. BAGif 
^ ^ 
AMENDMENT TO WELL LEASE AND WATER LINE EXTENSION AGREEMENT 
This Amendment made and entered into this &J- day 
of July, 1985, by and between Jesse H. Dansie, hereinafter 
referred to as •Dansie,' and Gerald H. Bagley, hereinafter 
referred to as •Bagley." 
W I T N E S S E T H 
WHEREAS, Dansie and Bagley, on April 7, 1977, entered 
into a Well Leas-e and Water Line Extension Agreement (herein-
after 'Well Lease Agreement'); and 
WHEREAS, Dansie and Bagley are concerned about 
possible ambiguities in Paragraph E. 2. of the Well Lease 
Agreement; and 
WHEREAS, the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association 
has filed a lawsuit based in part on.interpretation of the Well 
Lease Agreement; and 
WHEREAS, Bagley is delinquent in the payment of his 
monthly rental payments, but desires 'to continue the Well Lease 
Agreement; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of. $10.00 (Ten) and 
other good and valuable consideration, the sufficiency of which 
is hereby admitted, Dansie and Bagley agree as follows: 
1. Paragraph E. 2. of the April 7, 1977 Well Leas** 
Agreement is amended to read as follows: 
2. Dansie shall have the right to receive 
up to five (5) residential hook-ups on to 
the water system on the Dansie property for 
members of his immediate family without any 
payment of hook-up fees and shall further 
hav- the right to receive up to 12 million 
(12,000,000) gallons of water per year from 
the combined water system at no cost for 
culinary and yard irrigation use on the 
Dansie property described herein plus Lot 51 
of Hi-Country Estates. Any meters required 
at any time by any person or entity for 
metering of Dansie's water shall be 
ourchased and installed by Bagley at no cost 
:o Dansie* Any use of water for the fight-
ing of fires, or losses caused by breaks or 
line ruptures shall not be charged against 
the 12,000,000 gallons to which Dansie is 
otherwise entitled, 
2. Paragraph E.5. of the April 7, 1977 Well Lease 
Agreement is amended to read as follows: 
5. Dansie shall have the right to use for 
any purpose and at no cost, any excess water 
from the High Country Estates Water Company 
System Well No. 1, not required or being 
used by Bagley or customers of the High 
County Estates Water Company. Dansie shall 
pay only the incremental pumping power costs 
associated with producing such excess water. 
3. All other provisions of the Well Lease Agreement 
shall remain in full force and effect. 
4. Nothing herein shall relieve Bagley from the 
obligation to make the monthly payments now delinquent or to 
become due under the Well Lease Agreement. 
4. This Amendment and the Well Lease Agreement as 
amended herewith, shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the respective parties hereto, their successors and 
assigns. 
this Amendme 
written. 
nt io b. „..«- th. -V - »•« »»« •"« 
n 
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ADDENDUM 7 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 1977 WELL LEASE 
AND WATER TRANSPORTATION AGREEMENT WAS A VALID ENCUM-
BRANCE ON THE WATER SYSTEM. 
The Court ruled in its "Order Regarding Amount Payable by 
Plaintiff for Subject Water System": 
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"1. The encumbrance of the water system which 
is the subject of this action represented by 
the Well Lease and Water Transportation Agree-
ment entered into in 1977 between Gerald H. 
Bagley and Jesse Dansie is and remains a valid 
encumbrance upon the subject water system, and 
requires the owner of the subject water system 
to permit the Dansie family to receive and 
transport, free of charge, water through the 
subject system in the amount of twelve million 
gallons per year or such larger amount as 
shall be permitted by the excess capacity of 
the system as long as the system exists and is 
operative." 
(R. 1627). 
The 1977 Well Lease and Water Transportation Agreement 
(attached as Add. 15 and admitted into evidence in the trial of 
this matter as Plaintifffs Exhibit 11, R. 1359, 1857-1867) was 
construed by the Public Service Commission as outlined in Point III 
of this brief supra. In addition to the fact that the Public 
Service Commission in its Report and Order dated March 17, 1986 
(Add. 2; R. 1044-1083) found this Agreement to be "grossly 
unreasonable" and "showering virtually limitless benefits on Jesse 
Dansie and the members of his immediate family", the P.S.C. found 
that paragraph F. 2 of this Agreement " . . . makes Bagley personal-
ly responsible to fulfill the terms and conditions of the lease, 
whether or not a water company is created to which Bagley conveys 
or assigns the Well Lease Agreement." (R. 1056). 
Based upon these findings of unreasonableness, the P.S.C. 
issued its Order dated March 17, 1986, requiring Foothills to 
" . . . obtain approval from this Commission before entering into 
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any future lease or sales agreements for the provision of water to 
Foothills' service area or any amendment to or assignment of any 
lease or sales agreement that is now in force or effect." (R. 
1079). No evidence was presented in the lower court, and it is 
simply incontroverted, that Foothills has failed to obtain the 
approval of the Public Service Commission for any amendment to or 
extension of this 1977 Well Lease and Water Line Extension 
Agreement. The Agreement by its own terms in paragraph A. 4 states 
that it terminates on April 10, 1987. Where the Agreement 
terminated on that date, and no extensions of the Agreement have 
been approved by the P.S.C., it is unconscionable for the lower 
court to have made Homeowners' Quiet Title Order subject to this 
alleged "encumbrance" on the water system. 
Homeowners were not parties to this Agreement; and to impose 
its "grossly unreasonable" terms upon them would be unfair and 
unjust, because they are the persons the Agreement was supposed to 
have benefited in the first place. 
In addition to the foregoing, the P.S.C. in its Report and 
Order of 1986 states that: 
"While no one can blame Mr. Dansie for desir-
ing to provide free water to his children in 
virtual perpetuity, this Commission would be 
abrogating its statutory duty were we to 
impose such a burden on Foothills' present and 
future customers. . . 
. . . We find that it would be unjust and 
unreasonable to expect Foothills 63 active 
customers to support the entire burden of the 
Well Lease Agreement • • • 
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j,i i | ii, i because no evidence was submitted during the trial 
of this matter by Appellees Agreement should be an 
encumbrance 'the water system. The failure of a rnai. no urt to 
entei requires that the judgment be vacated. 
Anderson v, Utah County Bd. of County Comm'rs, riflrJ P.2d 1214 (Utah 
1979). There only a single Finding of Fact relating tc the 
Agreement, » is Finding of Fact No. 5: 
"That certain Well Lease and water Line Exten-
sion Agreement entered into by and between Dr. 
Gerald H. Bagley and Jesse Dansie in 1977 was 
and is a valid and fully binding encumbrance 
on the subject water system, mandating that 
the owners of the Dansie family property 
described therein are entitled, without 
charge, to obtain water from the water system 
from the Dansie Well located on property 
adjacent to Hi-Country Estates Phase I Subdi-
vision to the Dansie property, in the amount 
of either twelve million gallons per year or 
such larger amount as the excess capacity of 
the system shall permit, as long as the system 
exists and is operative. That encumbrance 
does not in any way legally burden the water 
system or the owner or operator of the water 
system." (Emphasis supplied). 
( ). 
This Finding * is internally inconsistem It states 
that the Agreem€ id arid fully binding encumbrance on the 
subject water system then in the last sentence suggests 1 licit 
imbrance "does not ay legally burden the water 
system or the owner or operate. i /atIT system Finding 
of Fact is simply incomprehensible! Furthermore, Finding of Fact 
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No. 5 is not a legitimate Finding of Fact, but constitutes a 
Conclusion of Law. 
The Conclusion of Law reached by the Court on this issue is 
"(T)he encumbrance to the subject water system and water right 
represented by the Well Lease and Water Line Extension Agreement 
entered into between Gerald H. Bagley and Jesse Dansie, entitles 
Foothills Water Company to continue to use the system to serve 
customers within its service area but outside of Hi-Country Estates 
Phase I" (R. 1624). In light of Finding of Fact No. 5 this 
Conclusion of Law seems just as inconsistent. What does it mean? 
The judge refers to "water right" here but the Agreement nowhere 
mentions "water right". It is the lease of a well! Interestingly 
enough, with a few minor exceptions, the "Order Regarding Amount 
Payable by Plaintiff for Subject Water System" paragraph 1, is 
almost verbatim the same as Finding of Fact No. 51 
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ADDENDUM 8 
POINT 
APPELLEES HAVE FAILED TO SUBSTANTIVELY RESPOND TO 
HOMEOWNERS' ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT'S ORIGINAL 
DECISION TO QUIET TITLE IN HOMEOWNERS, BUT SUBJECT 
TO THE 1977 WELL LEASE AGREEMENT AND CONTINUED 
TRANSPORTATION OF WATER THROUGH THE SYSTEM BY 
FOOTHILLS, WAS ERRONEOUS. 
1' i * s .D(?r ' ^ - ' P t H"inuHugrif.M n i it»il t h a i t h< wei : o u i 1 s 
initial decision tr enter a qu I M t itle order in its favor but 
subject to t.ie 13 7/ welx Lease Agreement between Gerald H Baq PV 
and Jesse Dans^e to transport free water through the system to the 
4U 
Dansie family was unfair, unjust and erroneous. (H.O. Op. Br. at 
pp. 42-47)* Homeowners pointed out that the Public Service 
Commission in its Report and Order dated March 17, 1986 had found 
this Agreement to be "grossly unreasonable" and "showering 
virtually limitless benefits on Jesse Dansie and the members of his 
immediate family." Homeowners also pointed out that it had not 
been a party to this Agreement and to impose its grossly 
unreasonable terms upon them would be unfair and unjust. 
Furthermore, Homeowners argued that the Agreement expired by its 
own terms on April 10, 1987 and no document of renewal in any form 
was presented to the trial court. Finally, Homeowners argued that 
Finding of Fact No. 5, upon which the court's order was based, was 
internally inconsistent and ambiguous (R.1622). 
Foothills responded to these arguments with less than a half 
a page in its brief (Cons. In. Br. of Foothills W.C., at pg. 43). 
Despite the fact that the Public Service Commission in its March 
17, 1986 Report and Order had ruled that the Agreement was grossly 
unreasonable and ordered Foothills Water Company to obtain its 
approval before entering into any future lease or sales agreement 
for the provision of water to Foothills' service area (R.1079), 
Foothills argues that "[T]he encumbrance was, if anything, 
recognized and validated by the Public Service Commission." This 
statement is simply false! Foothills' refusal to even respond to 
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the argument that the Agreement expireiJ on L L S ! cm e on A(,u i 1 Iff, 
1987, shows that It simply has no basis upon which it: can argue 
that the judge's UJ dh ijph*>i»i w • egard to that Agreement. 
Furthermore, Homeowners argued opeiunq In .i e I: I hiat I In-
coui t '" si i n j "• decision to provide a quiet title order to the 
water system Homeowner allowing Foothills tn 
continue to transport water through the system to customers jutti le 
of 1 1, I Con mtr> Estates Subdivision Phase 1 was clearly erroneous. 
Homeowners argued that no ev. k mil w«*l« presented to the 
lower court - justify this portion of the order in addition, 
Homeow appropriate finding of fact or conclusion 
of law was entered by the court to support Lhis provi s'lun, MH1 
therefore that portion of the order should be vacated upon remand. 
(H C J'IJ , hi .f I 4 • 4 '-* ' :" 
Foothills simply argues in its Consolidated Initial Briet that 
this issue is moot. However, Homeowners are requesting that this 
Court reverse the lowfi U'NII I 'iiiciqimei I HI qu i p(;( i mqi r j t 1 cj to the 
water system and water right in Foothills and remand the case with 
instructions *-M enter a quiet title order In favor of Homeowners. 
Homeowners also ask that t.Jiib O nxi" t, i, iiiv,fi 1 i da tie this encumbrax ice 
requiring Homeowners to allow Foothills to transport water through 
jts system !,, M it ride • ustomers. Only in this way can the court's 
determination be truly fair and just. Even though an appellate 
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court may reverse a judgment due to any number of reasons, it does 
have the power to review and decide matters which may become 
material when a case is remanded for further proceedings. LeGrand 
Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, supra; Anderson v. Utah County Board of 
County Commissioners, supra. 
It is to be noted that Appellees Bagleys do not even address 
the issues contained in this Point. 
POINT VI 
FOOTHILLS1 CLAIMS FOR SLANDER OF TITLE WERE 
APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
In its Consolidated Initial Brief ^ Foothills argues^thatrthere" -~ 
was "undisputed evidencej^that the actions of Homeowners, through, 
its president Norman Sims and its agent William Turner, slandered 
the title of Foothills Water Company to the water system and the 
water right. The trial court dismissed these allegations outright. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated October 20, 
1989, and again in its Order on Ownership Issues dated October 20, 
1989, the court states: "The counterclaim by Foothills Water 
Company is hereby dismissed for lack of proof" (R.897, 904). 
The court obviously believed Foothills had failed to present 
sufficient evidence to make out the elements of an action for 
slander of title. In Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield, 751 P.2d 
1131 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court stated the elements of slander 
of title as follows: 
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ADDENDUM 9 
* %<~* Jit — tmmJ^ 
FED oS 1S96 
"-IE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo - - - -
:•? APPEALS 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Association, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant: and 
Cross-appellee, 
Bagley & Company, a Utah 
•Corporation; J. Rodney Dansie; 
Gerald Bagley; Hi-Country 
Estates, Inc., a dissolved 
Utah corporation; Keith 
Spencer; Charles E. Lewtcn; 
and unknown persons claiming 
an interest in Hi-Country 
Estates Subdivision, 
Defendants/Appellees and 
Cross-appellants. 
Foothills Water Company, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee and 
Cross-appellant, 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Association, a Utah 
corporation; W Norman Sims; 
and William P Turner, 
Plaintiff/Appellant and 
Cross-appellee. 
QKDEP UN BRIEFINfi 
Case H« 04so -I;A 
Before Judges Davis, Billings, and Jackson. 
The Court of Appeals issued an opinion herein on September 
22, 1993, which is reported at 863 P.2d 1 (Utah App, 199?1 
Appellee Foothills Water Company filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari "for the narrow purpose of reviewing the court of 
appeals1 decision concerning the jurisdiction of the Public 
Service Commission (PSC; as it related to issues in this case." 
By a published opinion issued July 20, 1995, the Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded the matter to the court of appeals as 
follows: 
On the basis of the foregoing, the court of 
appeals' reversal of the district court's 
denial of the Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Association's motion for summary judgment on 
the issue of the amount of reimbursement owed 
to Foothills Water Company is reversed. The 
court of appeals' determination that the 
PSC's order invalidated the 1977 well lease 
agreement between Bagley and Dansie is also 
reversed, and this matter is remanded to' the 
court of appeals for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc, v. Baaley & Company et al.. 
901 P.2d 1017, 1024(Utah 1995). 
The following holdings contained in this courtf s opinion 
were unaffected by the opinion on certiorari and, accordingly, 
have been affirmed: 
1. Appellant Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association 
holds legal title to the water right, lots and system. 
2. The case is remanded to the district court for 
entry of a quiet tile order in the Homeowners 
Association's favor that is not subject to any 
contingency. 
3. Gerald H. Bagley is not entitled to damages. Id. 
at 1019 n.2. 
4. The trial court:' s dismissal of Foothills Water 
Company's claim for slander of title is affirmed. Id. 
at 1019 n.l. 
The Supreme Courtf s opinion also concluded that the issue of 
whether this court erred in reversing a district court order 
permitting the Foothills Water Company to transfer water through 
the system to customers within its service area but outside of 
the subdivision is now moot because the water company has since 
been decertified as a public utility by the PSC. Id. at 1020 n.3. 
Accordingly, the only issues before the court on remand to 
be briefed by the parties and determined by this court are (1) 
920456-CA 2 
whether the district court correctly determined the fair market 
value of the water right, system and lots was $98,500 under the 
theory of unjust enrichment, and (2) whether the district court 
correctly held that the well lease agreement was a valid and 
binding encumbrance on the water system. This court's opinion 
held that the PSC's determination bearing on these issues was 
dispositive and thus binding on the district court. The opinion 
did not review the evidentiary basis for the district court's 
valuation of the water right, system and lots and did not 
determine appellant's claim that the well lease agreement had 
lapsed. Accordingly, the parties shall address the following 
sub-issues: 
1. Whether the Utah Supreme Court's opinion
 r e q U i r e s 
affirmance of the district court's ruling on fair 
market value of the water right, system and lots and 
the validity :f tho well lease as an encumbrance on the 
system. 
2 Whether the district court's finding, under a 
theory of "unjust enrichment" that the fair market 
value of the water right, system and lots is $98,500 is 
clearly erroneous. 
J. Whether the well lease agreement Is a valid and 
binding encumbrance on the system, and in conjunction 
-- therewith, whether the well lease agreement has lapsed. 
Appellant filed a Motion to Decide Certain Appeal Issues on 
Other Grounds, appellee filed a response, and appellant filed a 
reply to appellee's response. Both parties concede that no n^'« 
substantive arguments can be raised that were not included in t he 
original briefs filed in this court. The discussion of facts 
shall be similarly limited to those facts stated in the two 
reported opinions; provided that, facts necessary to an 
understanding of the issues to be briefed may be included to the 
extent they are not inconsistent with the facts in the reported 
opinions. Briefs that do not comply with this order are subject 
to being stricken on motion or sua sponte by the court pursuant 
to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT_IS_HEREBY ORDERED that appellant shall file its brief / 
within thirty days of the date hereof, appellee shall thereafter 
have thirty days to file a responsive brief, and appellant's 
reply brief, if any, shall be filed within thirty days of the 
o 
filing date of appellee's brief. All briefs shall be limited to 
the issues outlined and described herein. 
t h i s ^ S i a y o day of February , 1996. 
James- 2T. Davis-f 
A s ^ ^ l a t e Presi^kfng Judge 
%LW 3i//>k 
d i t h M. B i l l i n g s , Judge 
m4J 
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